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The Rise and Fall of the Implied 
Warranty of Habitability 
David A. Super* 
Growing concern about poverty in the late 1960s produced two 
sweeping legal revolutions. One gave welfare recipients specific 
legal rights against arbitrary eligibility rules and benefit 
terminations. The other gave low-income tenants recourse when 
landlords failed to repair their homes. The 1996 welfare law exposed 
the welfare rights revolution’s frailty by ending Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) and severely cutting other key 
programs. Little noticed by legal scholars, the tenants’ rights 
revolution’s centerpiece, the implied warranty of habitability, also 
has failed, and for broadly similar reasons.  
Deliberately withholding rent to challenge a landlord’s failure 
to repair is not viable for many tenants in ill-maintained dwellings: 
either moving to better housing is a smarter option or the risk of 
retaliation from the tenant’s landlord is too great. The implied 
warranty could still motivate landlords to repair if it limited evictions 
of low-income tenants who fall behind on their rent for other reasons, 
but a set of obscure yet powerful doctrines deem these tenants 
unworthy to claim the warranty’s protection. Moreover, reformers 
left implementation to courts with neither the resources nor the 
inclination to transform landlord-tenant relations.    
None of this was inevitable. The doctrines that effectively limited 
the warranty to deliberate withholding of rent had weak 
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justifications. And contemporaneous procedural innovation in other 
areas of law offered alternatives to the unresponsive courts.   
More daunting than legal doctrine was the transformation of the 
housing market. In today’s market, fewer low-income tenants live in 
decrepit dwellings, but many suffer housing problems whose 
consequences may be even more severe: overcrowded units, locations 
far removed from jobs and good schools, and unmanageable rents. 
Lacking a clear, unified purpose, the tenants’ rights revolution’s 
legacy has failed to address these changes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The antipoverty movement in the 1960s spawned two seemingly very 
different legal revolutions. In public law, the courts gave low-income people 
new substantive and procedural rights to welfare and other public benefits, and 
Congress established new or expanded programs providing health insurance, 
food assistance, and aid to the elderly and persons with disabilities. In private 
law, courts and state legislatures recognized sweeping new rights for low-
income tenants. The focus of this effort was to find an implied warranty of 
habitability in residential leases, which was mutual with the tenant’s covenant 
to pay rent. The foundational cases of these two revolutions, Goldberg v. Kelly1 
and Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,2 are the only poverty law cases many 
law students read.3 
Over the past two decades, many of the pillars of the welfare rights 
revolution have collapsed. Congress repealed the sixty-year-old Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) welfare program,4 sought to strip welfare 
recipients of legal entitlements,5 slashed program funding,6 and shifted 
policymaking authority to states,7 whose will8 and capacity9 to assist low-
 
1. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
2. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).  
3. In addition, some contracts casebooks include Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). That case initially seemed to be the opening shot in a 
revolution on behalf of low-income consumers. Difficulty formulating satisfactory doctrinal bases 
of such a program, however, left only a smattering of isolated cases. The difficulties that aborted 
the nascent low-income consumers’ revolution parallel closely those of the tenants’ rights 
revolution addressed below. 
4. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-193, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2105, 2112 repealing 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–617 (1994)). 
5. Id. § 116(c) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 note (2006)) (disclaiming any entitlement to 
cash assistance after October 1, 1996); id. § 601(b) (same); see David A. Super, Are Rights 
Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of Individual Rights, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 
1085–97 (2005) (describing the accomplishments and limits of legal entitlements in public 
benefits law) [hereinafter Super, Efficient Rights]. 
6. DAVID A. SUPER ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, THE NEW WELFARE 
LAW (1996) (finding that the 1996 welfare law cut almost $55 billion over six years from 
programs for low-income people). 
7. See Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 600–04 (2004) 
(identifying structural and substantive difficulties in transferring welfare programs to states). 
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income people is open to question. More broadly, the switch from large 
government budget surpluses early in the last decade to deficits as far as the eye 
can see,10 and the impending retirement of the baby boomers, have created 
fiscal pressures likely to lead to strong pressures for further cutbacks in these 
programs.11 The prospects for substantial improvements to the government’s 
tax-and-transfer policies for low-income people therefore are cloudy at best.  
Under these circumstances, regulatory policy naturally will receive 
renewed attention as an alternative means of relieving low-income people’s 
difficulties. Developing countries lacking the resources and infrastructure to 
relieve poverty through tax-and-transfer policies commonly maintain a range of 
industrial subsidies, price controls, trade restraints, and other market 
interventions, with the goal of easing the burdens of their poorest citizens.12 
Anti-regulatory economists have largely persuaded policymakers in this 
country that direct governmental transfers are a far superior means of poverty 
reduction,13 but both legislatures and courts are likely to reopen that question if 
direct transfers cease to be available due to budgetary constraints. If regulation 
is reconsidered, the tenants’ rights revolution—the boldest regulatory assault on 
poverty since the New Deal—will likely be a major focus of attention. 
The late 1960s and early 1970s saw wide-ranging changes in tenants’ 
rights. The civil rights movement led to prohibitions on racial discrimination.14 
Federal housing programs began subsidizing rents in privately owned 
buildings; landlords accepting those subsidies were required to afford tenants a 
host of new rights.15 Some jurisdictions imposed rent control,16 prohibited 
evictions without just cause,17 limited condominium conversions,18 or 
 
 8. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: 
Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 585 (1999) (finding state 
political processes dominated by affluent suburban interests hostile to low-income people).   
 9. See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2614–40 
(2005) (finding states’ fiscal constitutions implicitly biased against programs for low-income 
people and particularly ill-suited to maintaining countercyclical programs).   
10. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (January 2010). 
11. See HENRY J. AARON & ROBERT D. REISCHAUER, COUNTDOWN TO REFORM: THE 
GREAT SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE 51–53 (rev. & updated ed. 2001). 
12. Economists commonly blame policies restricting free trade for poverty in developing 
countries. See, e.g., JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY 52–55 (2005); MILTON FRIEDMAN, 
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 72–73 (1962). Whether or not this oversimplifies, the reverse 
certainly is often true: severe poverty, and the failure to address it directly through transfers, 
creates political imperatives to intervene in the market for low-income people.   
13. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 177–82. 
14. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act of 1968, Public Act No. 112 of 1968 (codified at MICH. 
COMP. LAWS §§ 564.101–564.704 (1970)), superseded by Public Act No. 453 of 1976. 
15. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.694a (West 2006) (prohibiting evictions 
from subsidized housing without just cause). 
16. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1947.8 (West 2011) (allowing localities to control rents). 
17. See, e.g., 2A N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18-61.2 (West 2000) (setting forth permissible causes 
for terminating tenancies).  
18. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 559.204 (West 2006) (giving tenants rights in 
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authorized receiverships for ill-maintained rental housing.19 The most 
prominent result of the revolution, however, was reading an implied warranty 
of habitability into residential leases,20 with a corollary prohibition on evictions 
in retaliation for asserting these new rights.21 These measures, eventually 
adopted in almost every state, seemed to reverse the landlord’s historical 
dominance of the landlord-tenant relationship.    
Reexamining the tenants’ rights revolution is particularly timely because 
of recent changes in the housing market. The burst of the housing bubble in 
2007 has resulted in a glut of vacant homes.22 In addition, high energy costs 
and urban revitalization programs are leading many more affluent people to 
abandon suburbs and return to central cities. Although not widely recognized at 
the time, a similar housing glut helped launch the tenants’ rights revolution23 by 
forcing a historically anomalous moderation in rents that caused many to 
believe tighter regulation was possible. The housing vacancies of the 1960s and 
1970s resulted from the white middle class’s abandonment of the central cities 
in response to racial fears, the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) deep 
subsidies of building costs, and the new Interstate Highway System’s subsidy 
of commuting costs from the suburbs.24 Many of the new suburbanites were 
first-time homebuyers vacating urban rentals. And for those who owned homes 
in cities, the subsidies were often sufficient to justify absorbing large losses on 
their former homes to relocate to the suburbs. This created a huge glut of 
housing, much of it initially quite good, that the urban rental market had to 
assimilate.25 For a variety of reasons, however, much of that housing was 
lost—abandoned, destroyed, or gentrified—and with it the prospects for a 
relatively inexpensive improvement in millions of low-income tenants’ quality 
of life. Subsidized housing has never been sufficient to accommodate more 
than a small fraction of this country’s low-income people; in its absence, older 
housing left by families moving to more desirable neighborhoods has been the 
major source of housing for low-income people.26 The failure to make the  
 
 
condominium conversions). 
19. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.535 (West 2006) (setting terms for such 
receiverships). 
20. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.139 (West 2006) (implying three quality-
related covenants into residential leases). 
21. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5720(1)(b), (c) (West 2000) (creating defenses 
against retaliation for complaints to code enforcement agencies or other lawful acts as a tenant). 
22. Jim Harger, Housing Groups Seek Inspection Equity; Single-Family Rentals, Inflated 
by Foreclosures, Get Free Pass, THE GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Dec. 21, 2010, at A1. 
23. Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Landlord-Tenant Law, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 
562–66 (1984). 
24. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 7–27 (1985). 
25. Id. at 203–18. 
26. MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION 5–6 (1976). 
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housing being vacated today due to mortgage foreclosures and reurbanization 
available to low-income people would repeat that tragedy. 
To avoid repeating the failures of past reforms requires understanding 
why they fell short. The similarities between the welfare rights revolution and 
the tenants’ rights revolution are instructive. The welfare rights revolution gave 
recipients of subsistence benefit programs the right to advance hearings to 
challenge reductions or terminations in those benefits27 and prohibited 
eligibility conditions not authorized by federal law,28 in particular rules 
counting money not available to families as income.29 
The essence of the tenants’ rights revolution was similarly straight-
forward. Legislatures and courts read implied warranties of habitability and 
repair into residential leases30 and made them mutual with the tenant’s 
covenant to pay rent.31 Tenants could raise the landlord’s failure to comply 
with these obligations as a defense in an eviction proceeding for nonpayment of 
rent.32 This was seen as updating landlord-tenant law from the archaic vision of 
estates in land to the modern world of contracts and as giving landlords 
incentives to repair blighted housing. An early flurry of scholarship debated the 
economics of housing code enforcement and, by extension, its private-law 
analogue, the implied warranty of habitability.33 In the following years, 
however, almost every state’s legislature or courts adopted the new regime.34 
Courts and legal scholars hailed these changes as breakthroughs in the battle 
against slum landlords and as powerful new remedies with which the urban 
poor could compel landlords to maintain their buildings adequately.35 Yet the 
results achieved by these changes in the law have been far from what their 
advocates predicted.   
The welfare rights revolution foundered for six basic reasons. First, it 
lacked a coherent, broadly accepted set of goals. Some saw the changes as 
modernizing administrative law to reflect contemporary means of security 
analogous to traditional property rights.36 Some saw the changes as a means of 
 
27. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 272–74 (1970). 
28. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 287 (1971). 
29. Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 559–60 (1970). 
30. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.139 (West 2005); UNIF. RESIDENTIAL 
LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.105, 7B U.L.A. 387 (2009) [hereinafter URLTA]; Javins v. 
First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Haw. 
1969). 
31. See, e.g., Berzito v. Gambino, 308 A.2d 17 (N.J. 1973); Fritz v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d 
339 (Minn. 1973). 
32. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5720(1)(f) (West 2000).   
33. See infra notes 103–117. 
34. ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT §§ 3:16, 3:30, 
3:31 (1980); id. §§ 3:16, 3.30, 3.31 (Cum. Supp. 2009). 
35. See, e.g., Carl Schier, Draftsman: Formulation of Policy, 2 PROSPECTUS 227 (1968); 
Mary Ann Beattie, Persuader: Mobilization of Support, 2 PROSPECTUS 239 (1968).  
36. Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771–74 (1964). 
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achieving various instrumental ends37 such as expanding the workforce,38 
promoting children’s education,39 or preserving social peace.40 Some saw the 
changes as a means of redistributing wealth,41 reversing a deeply entrenched 
American resistance to redistribution.42 Finally, some saw the new legal regime 
in narrower, humanitarian terms as a means of relieving the most severe 
hardships.43 Although subscribers to these widely divergent viewpoints could 
all support new procedural rights for welfare claimants, their coalition quickly 
fractured when new challenges arose, such as growing public hostility to 
welfare programs and recipients’ inability to navigate the hearing process.   
Second, at the same time the new order was empowering low-income 
people, it could not resist moralizing about them. During the New Deal, the 
U.S. Supreme Court boldly declared that “[p]overty and immorality are not 
synonymous.”44 By the 1960s, however, the Court was conceding low-income 
people’s immorality and making only technical arguments against rules to 
punish them: “Congress has determined that immorality and illegitimacy 
should be dealt with through rehabilitative measures rather than measures that 
punish dependent children . . . .”45 It temporarily abandoned its doctrine of 
rejecting attempts to add eligibility conditions not in public benefits statutes to 
permit local governments to deny aid to families refusing intrusive investi-
gations of their morality.46 And beginning just weeks after Goldberg v. Kelly, it 
upheld rules reducing or denying benefits based on dubious individual47 or 
collective48 moral judgments. For many low-income people, the material 
sustenance these moralizing rules withheld was far more important than the 
procedural rights they granted.49 If anything, the veneer of procedural regularity  
 
 
37. David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the 
Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 597 (2008) [hereinafter Super, Laboratories]. 
38. DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT 19–25 (1988). 
39. HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR 115 (1995). 
40. WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE 319–21 (5th ed. 1994). 
41. Super, Laboratories, supra note 37, at 596.  
42. For example, in the Federalist Papers, James Madison argued that the structure of 
government must ensure the defeat of factions seeking redistribution. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 
(James Madison). 
43. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 277 (1970); Super, Laboratories, supra note 
37 at 594–95. 
44. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941). 
45. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325 (1968).  
46. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (allowing officials to make submission to 
intrusive home visits a condition of eligibility for AFDC). 
47. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (declining to determine whether the state 
had adequately accounted for the needs of children in large families). 
48. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (allowing states to provide lower grants to 
families with children, a group composed disproportionately of African Americans and Latinos, 
than to the elderly and persons with disabilities, both groups composed predominately of whites). 
49. See Super, Efficient Rights, supra note 5, at 1086–88 (finding only a tiny fraction of 
recipients sought fair hearings and only a small fraction of those prevailed). 
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added to the sting of the moralizing rules, inhibiting deeper change by giving 
the impression that only the confirmed immoral still faced hardship.50 
Third, the new welfare regime lacked a coherent, plausible theory of the 
nature and causes of poverty. It seemed to regard failures to address poverty as 
resulting from aberrations, such as the isolated irrationality of a hasty eligibility 
decision or a rogue eligibility rule. In particular, it assumed that low-income 
people, although financially impoverished, were relatively affluent in human 
capital. Thus, people dependent on subsistence benefits, providing far less than 
even many part-time minimum wage jobs, nonetheless were assumed to have 
the procedural sophistication to initiate and prosecute claims under a system of 
legal rules that even the Supreme Court characterized as “an aggravated assault 
on the English language, resistant to attempts to understand it.”51 When it 
turned out that few recipients could bring successful claims on their own, and 
that Congress was unwilling to fund legal services lawyers to handle more than 
a tiny fraction of the cases,52 the new procedural rights became an occasional 
annoyance53 rather than a meaningful force in program operations.54 
Fourth, and related, the welfare rights revolution had a crude vision of 
economics and, in particular, of the conditions and incentives of low-income 
people. It ignored transaction costs’ impact on people with very limited means, 
which can approximate that of outright denials of benefits.55 More broadly, it 
ignored the sense of vulnerability that dominates low-income people’s lives, 
creating pervasive fear and stifling assertions of whatever rights they may 
have.56 This simplistic economic model also ignored complexities of the 
incentives and opportunities of those whom it sought to influence—welfare 
eligibility workers.   
Fifth, the welfare rights revolution also had a crude vision of institutional 
behavior. It incorrectly assumed both that administrative hearing procedures 
and broad class action lawsuits would motivate individual eligibility workers to 
follow rules57 and that no contrary pressures would arise.58 
Finally, the welfare rights revolution failed to anticipate important 
changes. It assumed that the conditions afflicting low-income people were 
static and would succumb to static reforms. The revolution was thus unprepared 
 
50. David A. Super, The New Moralizers: Transforming the Conservative Legal Agenda, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 2032, 2066–72 (2004) [hereinafter Super, New Moralizers]. 
51. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 n.14 (1985). 
52. Super, Efficient Rights, supra note 5, at 1093–95. 
53. Id. at 1087–88. 
54. Id. at 1097–1117. 
55. David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice Model 
for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 832–35 (2004) [hereinafter Super, Invisible 
Hand].  
56. Super, Efficient Rights, supra note 5, at 1088. 
57. Id. at 1086–89. 
58. Id. at 1097–1117. 
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for the economic changes after the recessions of 1979–82 eliminated many of 
the high-paying, low-skilled industrial jobs that had been the ladder out of 
poverty for tens of millions of people.59 Thus, the poverty rate generally 
declined through the 1970s as Congress strengthened antipoverty programs60 
but then rose dramatically as President Reagan pushed deep cuts in those 
programs through Congress61 and recipients could find only low-paying, often 
contingent, service-sector jobs.62 The welfare rights revolution also failed to 
anticipate changing models of program administration, particularly 
privatization.63 The lack of consensus about the reforms’ goals, as well as the 
difficulty of the economic challenges, prevented formulation of a coherent 
proposal to adapt to dramatic changes in housing markets, labor markets, and 
antipoverty policy in subsequent decades. 
This Article argues that the tenants’ rights revolution suffered from the 
same six fundamental defects that prevented the welfare rights revolution from 
having a meaningful impact on poverty, and that it has failed similarly. Part I 
surveys the genesis of the implied warranty of habitability and related 
innovations. It finds the same normative ambivalence—cleaving on very 
similar lines—that prevented the welfare rights revolution from adapting. Some 
saw the reforms in solely legalistic terms: replacing property law’s 
exceptionalism with contract law’s efficient universality. Others had instru-
mental aims, seeing tenant protections as a means of improving the urban 
physical environment. Still others saw the reforms as a covert means of 
achieving broader redistributive ends. Finally, some held a humanitarian vision 
of empowering tenants to remedy deplorable housing conditions.64 In addition, 
in the years immediately after the urban riots of the mid-1960s, some thought 
the reforms would contribute to social peace. 
Part I then distills the conditions that must be met for landlord-tenant 
reforms to achieve each of these purposes. It finds that, just as new procedural 
due process rights were only relevant if claimants challenged denials of 
benefits, tenants’ ability and willingness to assert the implied warranty of 
habitability were crucial to the tenants’ rights revolution. Two groups of 
tenants—those who are financially stable and those who are not—face 
significantly different incentive structures. Financially stable tenants are much 
less likely to withhold rent voluntarily to force a confrontation with their 
landlords than deeply impoverished tenants are to challenge their landlords’ 
failure to repair when they become involuntary defendants in eviction actions 
 
59. MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN 
WELFARE STATE 30–39 (2001). 
60. Super, Laboratories, supra note 37, at 584–86.  
61. Id. at 587–88. 
62. KATZ, supra note 59, at 348–53. 
63. David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 393, 
433–44 (2008). 
64. See infra Part I.A. 
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after falling behind on rent for other reasons. Also vital are the courts’ 
allocation of sufficient adjudicatory resources to these cases and their ability to 
transform their relationships with landlords and tenants. Finally, much of the 
benefit of the new regime depends on favorable housing market conditions. 
Although several theories of such conditions emerged, the most important raise 
significant paradoxes. 
Part II identifies the key obstructions to the effectiveness of the reforms. 
One set of barriers are little-noticed substantive restrictions on the implied 
warranty of habitability that have the effect of preventing most involuntary 
defendants—those most likely to raise the warranty—from doing so effectively. 
The other barriers are procedural, arising from the lower courts’ failure to adapt 
to the very different goals and demands of the new regime they were asked to 
enforce. Many of these procedural barriers have close analogues in the public 
benefits realm. 
Part III finds the new regime’s failure inevitable, both because of its own 
internal shortcomings and because of broader changes in the low-income 
housing market. It finds these legal shortcomings particularly unfortunate. It 
sees dubious policy and doctrinal support for the substantive rules that have 
closed the courts to tenants living in decrepit housing whose failure to pay rent 
resulted from poverty rather than militancy. It also suggests that lessons from 
the “new property” realm of public benefits can guide adjudication in the “old 
property” world of landlord-tenant law. In the end, however, it finds 
fundamental changes in the low-cost housing market transformed the meaning 
of bad housing conditions, leaving the new legal regime ill-suited to confront 
low-income tenants’ most serious problems. In the same way, the legacy of the 
welfare rights revolution has proven ineffective in responding to the increasing 
inadequacy of benefit levels and the collapse of political support for key 
programs. This finding suggests far stronger commonalities between fiscal and 
regulatory antipoverty law than commonly understood.    
The Article concludes with some observations about how to combat the 
range of housing problems facing low-income people and offers broad 
suggestions about how regulatory interventions on behalf of low-income people 
can be more effective. In so doing, it offers a way to integrate lessons from the 
welfare and tenants’ rights revolutions. 
I. 
THE PROMISE OF THE TENANTS’ RIGHTS REVOLUTION 
Because the tenants’ rights revolution enjoyed broad and diverse adoption, 
it should not be surprising that the implied warranty of habitability had more 
than one driving purpose. On the national level, the tenants’ rights revolution of 
the late 1960s and 1970s was unusual among law reform initiatives in that it 
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proceeded simultaneously through case law and legislation.65 In some states, 
the courts went first in announcing a warranty of habitability. In others, the 
legislature acted, sometimes by adopting the Uniform Residential Landlord and 
Tenant Act (URLTA)66 and sometimes by amending existing summary eviction 
statutes.67 Although the implied warranty received considerable attention in 
states that had been wracked by urban unrest in the 1960s, it came into force in 
many rural states at about the same time. 
Section A identifies four leading purposes of the tenants’ rights 
revolution. All but one of these purposes was instrumental, seeing the new legal 
regime as a means of accomplishing one or another change in society rather 
than as an end in itself. Disagreement about the relative importance, or even 
basic legitimacy, of these purposes proved important in limiting their 
effectiveness, as Part II demonstrates. Section B then explores the conditions 
necessary for the achievement of the new regime’s instrumental goals.   
A. The Goals of the Tenants’ Rights Revolution 
The tenants’ rights and welfare rights revolutions proceeded from 
strikingly similar premises. Four major purposes motivated the welfare rights 
revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. First, some saw the extension of legal rights 
to public benefits cases as a modernizing move, affording the vital interests of 
those programs’ beneficiaries the same kinds of protections that real property 
had secured to individual interests in an agrarian age.68 Second, some 
advocated expanding low-income people’s rights in public benefit programs as 
a means of accomplishing other social ends, such as reducing crime and 
securing social peace.69 Third, welfare rights appealed to some as a means of 
redistributing income.70 Finally, giving public benefit programs’ recipients 
legal rights seemed to some an effective means of achieving the humanitarian 
ends of those programs.71 
 
65. See Neil K. Komesar, The Revolution in Landlord-Tenant Law: A Comparative 
Institutional View, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 612 (1984) (urging comparison of the efficiency of these 
two paths). 
66. 7B U.L.A. 387 (Supp. 1999); see Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and 
the American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L. REV. 879 (1975) (discussing how ALI helped lead this 
transformation). 
67. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.5720, 600.5741 (1972). 
68. See Reich, supra note 36, at 785–86 (arguing that property rights are crucial to 
defending the individual against state intrusion and that public benefits form the modern analogue 
to traditional property rights). 
69. See U.S. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 457–67 (1968) [hereinafter KERNER COMMISSION 
REPORT]. 
70. See FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS 
264–65 (1977). 
71. See Super, Laboratories, supra note 37, at 594–95; Super, Efficient Rights, supra note 
5, at 1058–60. 
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Each of these purposes had at least a rough analogue in the four major 
purposes animating the tenants’ rights revolution. Subsection 1 analyzes the 
legalistic, modernizing narrative of these reforms as replacing a paradigm 
based on estates in land with one based on contract law. Subsection 2 explores 
the instrumental motivation: improving the quality of urban housing through 
the agency of tenants of substandard units.72 Subsection 3 briefly sketches the 
redistributive motives of some reformers. Subsection 4 considers the 
humanitarian vision of these reforms as improving the lives of low-income 
tenants. Finally, Subsection 5 notes an additional set of instrumental concerns 
that may have motivated the reforms’ initial adoption but which soon 
disappeared from discussions of landlord-tenant law. Although these goals are 
superficially harmonious with one another, and indeed often invoked jointly by 
advocates of the reforms, Part III will demonstrate that the full realization of 
these goals may be inconsistent. 
1. Modernization: Triumph of Contract over Estates in Land 
Some courts and legislatures sought to explain the implied warranty of 
habitability, and the process of treating it as mutual with the tenant’s duty to 
pay rent, as harmonizing landlord-tenant law with broader principles of 
contract law.73 Some courts undoubtedly believed that the principles embodied 
in contract law were inherently fairer than the medieval property concepts that 
previously governed landlord-tenant relations in general and leases in 
particular. And some courts may simply have been offended by the disparity in 
treatment between landlords and tenants: while the courts rigorously enforced 
tenants’ obligations to pay rent with expedited procedures, landlords were 
under virtually no pressure to perform their obligations to their tenants.74  
This vision had the virtue of simplicity. The lease, as amended by the 
implied warranty, became a contract between landlord and tenant. As with 
 
72. Other factors also may have contributed to the reforms. Some small states with part-
time legislatures often adopt uniform laws such as URLTA as an efficient way of keeping in step 
with the rest of the country. Similarly, once several states’ courts had adopted the implied 
warranty, other states may have followed suit absent any clear reason to make the law of their 
state an outlier. None of these considerations, however, likely would have driven such a thorough 
overhaul of centuries of well-settled law. 
73. Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See generally 
Leslie E. Gerwin, A Study of the Evolution and Potential of Landlord Tenant Law and Judicial 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism in the District of Columbia, Part I: The Substantive Law and the 
Nature of the Private Relationship, 26 CATH. U. L. REV. 457 (1977) (finding conformity to 
modern notions of contract law was one of the key factors guiding the evolution of a new 
landlord-tenant legal regime). 
74. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1082 (“[T]he legislature has made a policy judgment—that it is 
socially (and politically) desirable to impose these duties on a property owner—which has 
rendered the old common law rule obsolete. To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of 
habitability in leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative policy 
concerning housing standards.” (alteration in original)). 
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parties to other contracts, their relationship was to be symmetrical before the 
law. The courts had long provided landlords with a service essential to their 
businesses: eviction procedures, operating far more expeditiously than other 
civil actions, allowed landlords quickly and inexpensively to coerce and 
remove any tenants not paying rent. The courts would now demand that, in 
exchange for this extraordinary help in requiring tenants to perform their legal 
obligations, landlords comply with the laws on health and safety. Contract law 
already had a host of principles for assessing performance, handling mutual 
breaches, measuring damages, and so forth. This allowed the new legal regime 
to burst onto the scene fully formed, without need for the time-consuming 
articulation over series of cases that had been required to transform civil rights 
law and criminal procedure. 
The central principles of the new regime of landlord-tenant law were as 
familiar to contract law as they were alien to feudal property law.75 The 
landlord’s new implied covenant of repair was made mutual with the tenant’s 
covenant to pay rent.76 The tenant owed the landlord rent only as long as the 
landlord maintained the premises. The landlord’s failure to maintain the 
premises violated a condition to her or his right to receive rent.77 
Because the contractualist view of the tenants’ rights revolution saw those 
changes as ends in themselves, it did not depend on any further actions by 
landlord or tenant. It did, however, depend on the courts to hew fairly closely to 
established principles of contract law in deciding landlord-tenant disputes. 
Their failure to do so in practice78 meant that one idiosyncratic legal regime, 
based on notions of estates in land, would give way to another, based on current 
public policy preferences.   
This situation was anathema to contract law. The creation of a large core 
of common principles of contract law had been one of the law’s great achieve-
ments in the nineteenth century.79 Given the instrumental nature of the other 
three major goals of the tenants’ rights revolution, keeping landlord-tenant law 
 
75. But see Michael Madison, The Real Properties of Contract Law, 82 B.U. L. REV. 405, 
410–26 (2002) (questioning whether the new regime of landlord-tenant law is true to contract 
principles); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 773, 820–34 (2001) (positing a more complex allocation of functions between property 
and contract). 
76. Rome v. Walker, 196 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972). 
77. The purely contractual rights tenants received with the implied covenants of repair are 
occasionally confused with rights tenants received at approximately the same time to participate in 
code enforcement proceedings. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.530(3)–(5) (West 2006); MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 441.570 (West 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-92(b) (West 2010); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 5321.07B(1) (LexisNexis 2004); Drew v. Pullen, 412 A.2d 1331, 1334 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1980); DePaul v. Kauffman, 272 A.2d 500 (Pa. 1971). Under these schemes, the 
tenant essentially becomes an agent of the code enforcement system. The tenant imposes what 
amounts to a penalty by depriving the landlord of rent until the landlord brings the premises up to 
code. City of Lakewood v. Novak, 111 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 (Lakewood Mun. Ct. 2000). 
78. See infra notes 200–203 and accompanying text. 
79. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 464–68 (1973).  
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in harmony with the larger body of contract law could be difficult. Although 
both landlords and tenants might invoke contract principles when convenient, 
the modernizing vision as an end in itself had no obvious, reliable advocates 
before either legislatures or courts. Indeed, some advocates’ tactical embrace of 
contract principles was so feeble that they failed to notice when contract law 
reasoning offered a rebuttal to efforts to restrict the scope of the reforms.80 
2. Urban Restoration: Improving Rental Housing Conditions 
Some courts’ and legislatures’ goals were more instrumental; they saw the 
implied warranty and its enforceability in actions for nonpayment of rent as a 
means of compelling landlords to maintain their buildings up to minimum 
standards of repair. Deteriorating housing conditions have serious negative 
effects on surrounding communities: they depress property values and hence 
property tax revenues, contribute to the spread of insect and rodent infestation, 
give cities a negative image with visitors, and are correlated with crime.81 
States therefore have reasons to want to ameliorate bad housing conditions 
completely independent of any concern for the well-being of low-income 
tenants. In this regard, these reforms sought to remedy the failures of 
“inefficient and unworkable” code enforcement82 that had failed “to halt or 
reverse urban blight.”83  
3. Redistribution: Tapping Landlords’ Wealth to Ameliorate Tenants’ Poverty 
Although underrepresented in judicial opinions, another significant force 
driving the tenants’ rights revolution was a desire to redistribute power,84 
wealth,85 and income86 into the hands of low-income people. Advocates saw 
 
80. For example, contractarian concepts permeate Javins, yet the court also drops a 
footnote that, in dicta, approves orders requiring tenants to continue performing their duty to pay 
rent in order to litigate their landlord’s prior breach of the implied warranty of habitability. Javins 
v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 n.67 (D.C. Cir. 1970). That requirement has no 
place in contract law. See infra notes 202–203, 300–305 and accompanying text.   
81. See EDWIN S. MILLS, URBAN ECONOMICS 178–79 (1st ed. 1972); James Q. Wilson & 
George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 
1982, at 29 (arguing that even modest defects can have devastating effects). 
82. Brett R. Dick & John S. Pfarr, Jr., Detroit Housing Code Enforcement and Community 
Renewal: A Study in Futility, 3 PROSPECTUS 61, 90 (1969). 
83. Judah Gribetz & Frank P. Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 
66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1255 (1966); see Samuel Jan Brakel, URLTA in Operation: The Oregon 
Experience, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 565, 578. 
84. SAR A. LEVITAN, THE GREAT SOCIETY’S POOR LAW 177–79 (1969) (describing the 
goals of the Office of Economic Opportunity’s Legal Services Program). 
85. Jonathan I. Rose & Martin A. Scott, “Street Talk” Summonses in Detroit’s Landlord-
Tenant Court: A Small Step Forward for Urban Tenants, 52 J. URB. L. 967, 979 (1975) (noting 
the Marxist critique of housing markets that society should provide housing without profit); 
Myron Moskovitz & The Nat’l Hous. & Econ. Dev. Law Project, Moving Toward Tenant Control 
of Housing, in TENANTS AND THE URBAN HOUSING CRISIS 203 (Stephen Burghardt ed., 1972). 
86. Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing 
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landlords’ property rights, and tenants’ lack of such rights, as defining broader 
status relationships.87 Redistributivists believed that landlords charged 
exorbitant rents and sought public intervention to transfer some of this value 
back to tenants.88 They sought to increase the bargaining power of tenants, 
especially poor tenants, relative to their landlords.89 Where tenants’ only legal 
remedy against their landlords had previously been costly and ineffective 
affirmative suits for damages (which, absent implied covenants of habitability, 
might have to be based on relatively far-fetched tort theories) they could not 
expect to have much effect on the landlords’ behavior. The threat of cutting off 
all rent revenues to a non-repairing landlord, however, when backed by law 
limiting the recoverability of that rent, would have to be taken much more 
seriously and would be much more likely to motivate landlords to make 
concessions to their tenants in the form of needed repairs. Many 
redistributivists saw the implied warranty of habitability and related doctrines 
not as ends in themselves but as necessary complements to achieving rent con-
trol90 and other policies that more directly redistributed wealth. 
Even on the left, however, this view was controversial: some felt that 
targeting landlords for redistribution diverted low-income people’s attention 
from the system as a whole.91 Some critics also saw legalization and 
institutionalization as sapping the tenants’ rights movement’s vital strength and 
paving the way for a backlash.92  
4. Humanitarianism: A Better Life for Low-Income Tenants 
One need not favor general redistribution of income to seek to ameliorate 
the most severe forms of hardship. Although this country’s politics have 
staunchly rejected broad governmental redistribution of income, middle-class 
voters have been much more sympathetic to efforts to prevent hunger, 
homelessness, and other forms of extreme hardship. This is true even where the 
required market intervention causes significant economic inefficiency.93 Non-
redistributivist humanitarians have, however, faced the administrative 
challenge of limiting their interventions to those most in need and the political  
 
 
Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1096, 1195 
(1971).  
87. Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor 
Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 571–75 (1992). 
88. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 977. 
89. Beattie, supra note 35, at 240. 
90. See, e.g., Scofield v. Berman & Sons, Inc., 469 N.E.2d 805, 812 (Mass. 1984); Rose & 
Scott, supra note 85, at 971 n.18. 
91. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 70, at 20–21. 
92. Id. at xxii. 
93. See JANET POPPENDIECK, SWEET CHARITY? EMERGENCY FOOD AND THE END OF 
ENTITLEMENT 141–52 (1998) (describing longstanding political enthusiasm for inefficient 
commodity distribution programs). 
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challenge of convincing policymakers and the public that they are not 
redistributivists.   
Similarly, the desire to improve housing conditions is not necessarily the 
same as improving the lot of the tenants in that housing. Urban renewal in the 
1960s addressed decrepit housing conditions by evicting tenants and 
demolishing their former homes. The HOPE VI program, developed in the 
1990s to convert public housing projects into mixed-income developments, 
took a similar approach, demolishing many units of decaying but inexpensive 
housing.94 This eliminated the bad housing, but the tenants in those 
neighborhoods were no longer around to enjoy whatever replaced it. Thus, the 
instrumentalist desire to press landlords to repair their dwellings is not 
necessarily pro-tenant even though it may depend heavily on tenants raising 
and winning habitability claims. Evicting low-income tenants and converting 
their former homes into well-maintained housing for the affluent would meet 
only the narrow objective of eliminating decrepit housing conditions, not the 
humanitarian goal of ameliorating tenants’ hardships. 
An important objective of the reforms was to improve the lives of the 
most hard-pressed tenants.95 Although framed in terms of expanding tenants’ 
rights, these rights existed to serve some purpose. Just as the civil rights 
movement won rights that people of color could use to improve their well-
being, so too this vision of the tenants’ rights movement sought to give low-
income tenants greater rights against their landlords, thus offering the means 
for those tenants to improve their standard of living.   
5. Social Stability 
Although some jurisdictions were moving to recognize the implied 
covenant of habitability in residential leases in the early 1960s,96 the urban riots 
of the mid-1960s put housing law “into a completely new perspective.”97 
Studies done immediately after the riots indicated that bad housing conditions 
were a major cause of the disturbances.98   
Here, too, the parallel between the two legal revolutions persisted as the 
welfare system took much of the blame for the disturbances.99 In both 
instances, however, when major unrest did not recur after 1968, social peace 
rapidly disappeared from policy discussions.  
 
94. David D. Troutt, Katrina’s Window: Localism, Resegregation, and Equitable 
Regionalism, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1109, 1140 (2008). 
95. Schier, supra note 35, at 227. 
96. See, e.g., Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1961). 
97. Beattie, supra note 35, at 242–44. 
98. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 968 n.8; “[G]rievances related to housing were 
important factors” fomenting discontent and leading to the riots. KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, 
supra note 69, at 472–73 (1968).   
99. KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 69, at 457. 
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B. Requirements for the New Regime’s Success 
Under the new landlord-tenant regime, tenants can bring repair disputes to 
court either offensively or defensively. Once the courts or legislature imply a 
warranty of habitability into residential leases, tenants in bad housing may sue 
their landlords for damages;100 some jurisdictions will also grant equitable 
relief to such tenants. In practice, however, most tenants remaining in bad 
housing lack the legal or economic resources to sue affirmatively. As a result, 
the best chance for repairs to be adjudicated is in connection with an 
affirmative defense or counterclaim to the landlord’s action for possession for 
nonpayment of rent.101 If the tenant can prove the existence of defects in the 
premises, the court should determine that she or he does not owe some or all of 
the rent the landlord claims. By grafting the new rights onto the existing 
statutory eviction procedures, which in most jurisdictions were already required 
to be heard and decided on an accelerated schedule, the legislatures and courts 
could hope for quick action against non-repairing landlords. Speed is important 
not just for the humanitarian imperative of correcting hazardous living 
conditions but also to give tenants sufficient incentives to assert their new legal 
rights in court. Faced with the prospect of a protracted legal battle with their 
landlords before any hope of getting repairs, most tenants in houses and 
apartments with serious health and safety hazards would be much more 
inclined to move. 
Inducing landlords to repair their units, however, is by no means as simple 
as revising substantive legal rules. The effectiveness of the reforms in changing 
landlords’ behavior depends on changing landlords’ economic incentives, 
which in turn depends in part on how effective low-income tenants are in 
asserting their new rights in court. Landlords have no incentive to maintain 
their units unless the cost of failing to do so exceeds the cost of repairs. The 
cost of failing to repair in the new legal regime depends upon four factors: the 
probability that a tenant in a substandard unit would assert her or his new legal 
rights, the probability that the tenant would be successful in doing so, and the 
cost of being held liable for failure to repair, all offset by any increase in the 
building’s value resulting from the repairs.102 Economic incentives were also 
important in the welfare rights context: the administrative fair hearings at the 
heart of the welfare rights revolution failed to achieve their promise in  
 
 
 
100. See, e.g., Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984) (recognizing affirmative suit to 
recover rent previously paid).   
101. Put another way, less expected benefit than will be required to justify an affirmative 
suit will be sufficient to make defensive invocation of the warranty cost-effective. 
102. Thus, repairing is only likely to be economically superior to ignoring a violation if: 
(ProbabilityTenant asserts warranty x ProbabilityTenant prevails x CostLoss) + ∆ ValueBuilding > 
CostRepairs. 
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significant part because the consequences for eligibility workers of losing the 
few hearings held were too minimal to influence behavior.103 
The landlord’s incentive to repair depends heavily upon the actions of 
both the tenant and the court.104 In addition, both the landlord’s actions and 
their consequences, for tenants and for the housing stock, depend on several 
crucial assumptions about housing markets and the nature of contemporary 
poverty. The following sections examine these prerequisites to the new 
regime’s success. 
1. Tenants’ Propensity to Assert the Warranty of Habitability 
The probability that the tenant in an ill-repaired unit will assert the 
warranty of habitability depends on the tenant knowing about the warranty, 
knowing how to raise it, and deciding that doing so is in her or his interest. 
Thus, increasing the number of low-income tenants aware of the warranty of 
habitability and how to assert it may increase the likelihood that landlords will 
be motivated to make repairs. Who might provide this information, however, is 
an open question. The appellate courts that announced the warranty of 
habitability in most states generally lack the facilities and inclination to conduct 
community legal education.105 State legislatures could finance such efforts, but 
even in those states where landlords could not block the warranty of 
habitability, they may have sufficient influence to prevent legislatures from 
funding outreach campaigns. Legal services and community organizations 
concerned about housing quality provide outreach in some areas, but these 
efforts are uneven and typically underfunded.106 Ultimately, awareness of the 
warranty depends heavily upon tenants learning about it through word-of-
mouth. And the likelihood that tenants aware of the warranty will pass that 
information along likely depends on how useful the warranty has seemed to  
 
 
103. Super, Efficient Rights, supra note 5, at 1086–89. 
104. The state of the real estate market in the area is also important. The repairs are more 
likely to add to the value of the property if the location is desirable enough to compete for tenants 
or buyers that would pay more for a better-maintained structure. In depressed areas, tenants may 
simply lack the funds to pay more rent for a better unit: their demand curve may become almost 
perfectly elastic at some point. For example, when the author worked as a legal services lawyer in 
impoverished North Philadelphia, his clients’ rent typically was five or ten dollars per month 
below the maximum public assistance grant amount. In this sense, the warranty of habitability is 
most likely to prove effective not in the troubled neighborhoods that typify deteriorating housing 
conditions to many but in more affluent areas where market forces already are providing landlords 
significant motivation. 
105. General consumer protection laws may require landlords to give tenants some 
information about their rights when seeking to collect rent. Mary B. Spector, Tenants’ Rights, 
Procedural Wrongs: Summary Eviction and the Need for Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 207–08 
(2000).  
106. See Super, Efficient Rights, supra note 5, at 1093–94 (describing chronic under-
funding of legal services programs). 
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them: tenants that have won repairs or financial recompense from their 
landlords are more likely to think the information is worth sharing. 
Even if a tenant in a badly repaired unit knows about the implied 
warranty, she or he may not know how to raise it effectively. Initiating an 
action—framing a complaint, filing the complaint and either paying the filing 
fee or submitting an adequate motion for a fee waiver, arranging service of 
process, and so forth—is more demanding for the novice litigant than asserting 
a defense, but even the latter can be a challenge. Some courts require written 
answers,107 which pro se litigants may not know how to generate. Even those 
courts that allow tenants to respond orally in open court on a particular day 
require a presence of mind and sense of timing that pro se litigants are likely to 
lack: the tenant may have only a few seconds to decide what to say, and the 
judge’s cue (such as “is this the amount you owe?”) may steer tenants into 
responding to the landlord’s accounting rather than raising an affirmative 
defense that may seem unresponsive. If the tenant does not understand what to 
say and when, her or his abstract awareness of the defense will be for naught. 
The knowledgeable tenant might decide to raise the warranty of 
habitability under either of two very different sets of circumstances. First, the 
tenant could raise the warranty deliberately to obtain either financial 
recompense or performance of the landlord’s duty to repair. Alternatively, a 
tenant in financial distress who has failed to pay rent for other reasons—such as 
lack of funds or other pressing priorities—may raise the warranty in an effort to 
rescue her or his tenancy. The following Subsections show that tenants who 
become defendants in nonpayment actions involuntarily are far more likely to 
assert the warranty and thus that the tenants’ rights revolution’s instrumental 
success depends heavily on their success. Yet as Part III.A explains, little-
appreciated substantive doctrines have prevented precisely these tenants from 
asserting the warranty. 
a. Deliberate Rent Withholding 
For a tenant the rationality of deliberately asserting the warranty depends 
on the likelihood that the tenant will be successful, the direct rewards (such as a 
rent abatement) the tenant will receive for being successful, the likelihood that 
the assertion of the warranty will cause the landlord to make repairs, the value 
of the repairs, and the costs the tenant will bear in raising the warranty. A 
rational tenant who knows about the warranty will choose deliberate rent 
withholding over the option of continuing to pay and endure the defects when 
the chances of the tenant prevailing times the benefits of prevailing—any rent  
 
 
 
 
107. BOSTON HOUS. CT. R. 3 (2009); Catelli v. Fleetwood, 842 A.2d 1078 (R.I. 2004). 
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abatement plus the possibility that the landlord will make valuable repairs—
exceed the costs of raising the warranty, including the adverse consequences of 
losing.108 
The costs of litigation include the direct costs of advancing a defense 
based on the warranty: time lost from work or other activities, fees and costs 
the court charges, any costs to obtain legal advice or representation, gathering 
evidence, and so on. The costs of litigation also include the chance that the 
tenant will not prevail and will have to move hurriedly. Finally, they include 
the chance that the landlord, although losing in the initial action, will retaliate 
against the tenant by terminating her or his lease, raising the rent, changing the 
locks, or taking other actions that injure the tenant or induce her or him to 
move.109 Thus, the legally aware tenant of substandard housing can expect to 
benefit more from raising the warranty of habitability than from suffering in 
silence when the potential benefits of raising the warranty—the likelihood and 
amount of any rent abatement and increased chance of getting repairs—exceed 
the transaction costs of litigation and the risk and costs of defeat or those of 
retaliation for a success.110 
In fact, however, tenants have a third alternative besides raising the war-
ranty of habitability and putting up with the defects: they can move. Therefore, 
the rational tenant will only withhold rent when both the expected value of 
doing so is positive and that expected value is greater than that of moving.111 
The appearance of moving costs (including the relative quality of current 
and prospective dwellings) on both sides of this calculation leads to something 
of a paradox. The expected value of asserting the warranty is more likely to be 
positive if the tenant is relatively willing to move. But a tenant willing to move 
quickly if the warranty-based defense fails112 or if the landlord retaliates 
 
108. Thus, the tenant will choose to withhold rent only when:  
(ProbTenant prevails x ValueDamages for prevailing tenant) + (ProbTenant prevails x ProbRepairs x 
ValueRepairs) > CostLitigation. 
109. The landlord may evict the tenant even more suddenly through self-help. In most 
jurisdictions, this is unlawful. But under a similar calculation, a landlord may conclude that the 
likelihood of the tenant suing and winning, and the amount the tenant is likely to recover in such a 
suit, is insufficient to dissuade her or him from engaging in self-help. 
The tenant’s burdens of litigation also include losses of value in the leasehold from the 
landlord’s unpleasant actions that fall short of compelling the tenant to move. 
110. Accordingly, raising the warranty is advantageous only when: 
(ProbTenant prevails in initial action x ValueDamages for prevailing tenant) + (ProbTenant prevails in initial action x 
ProbRepairs x ValueRepairs) > ((1-ProbTenant prevails in initial action) x (CostMoving + ValueCurrent 
dwelling – ValueNew dwelling)) + (ProbTenant prevails in initial action x (1-ProbTenant avoids retaliation) x 
(CostMoving + ValueCurrent dwelling – ValueNew dwelling)) + Direct CostLitigation. 
111. Specifically, we can expect a tenant to assert the warranty only when: 
(ProbTenant prevails in initial action x ValueDamages for prevailing tenant) + (ProbTenant prevails in initial action x 
ProbRepairs x ValueRepairs) – ((1-ProbTenant prevails in initial action) x (CostMoving + ValueCurrent 
dwelling – ValueNew dwelling)) – (ProbTenant prevails in initial action x (1-ProbTenant avoids retaliation) x 
(CostMoving + ValueCurrent dwelling – ValueNew dwelling)) – Direct CostLitigation > CostMoving + 
ValueCurrent dwelling – ValueNew dwelling. 
112. Indeed, even if the tenant’s defense succeeds, the landlord or code enforcement 
authorities may require the tenant to move to facilitate repairs. Knott v. Laythe, 674 N.E.2d 660 
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successfully, may find moving without asserting the warranty a more reliable 
and efficient method of escaping a substandard dwelling.113   
Thus, in a market where moving is fairly inexpensive, tenants in bad 
housing might be less afraid to fight but still prefer to move because they have 
a substantial chance of finding better housing. There, tenants’ mobility rather 
than the warranty of habitability is likely to be the principal engine driving 
improvements in housing quality. This does not seem problematic, as the ease 
of moving suggests that, at least in the short term, the market is giving tenants 
some leverage.   
On the other hand, in a tight housing market, tenants of substandard 
housing may feel they dare not assert the warranty because the likelihood they 
will end up somewhere worse is high. As a result, for the warranty of 
habitability to have a significant impact on housing conditions, raising it may 
need to be affirmatively attractive or only modestly costly; that raising it is 
simply less costly than enduring defective housing likely will not suffice. Thus, 
inducing tenants in tight housing markets to assert the warranty requires highly 
favorable values for the other elements in the calculation, including the tenant’s 
chances of winning in the initial action and in avoiding retaliation, the damages 
(or rent abatement) awarded, and the likelihood that the landlord will repair. As 
Subsection 2 shows, this combination of circumstances is quite unlikely. 
The importance of moving costs in this calculation also tends to skew the 
warranty’s impact in favor of better-off tenants, undermining the reforms’ 
instrumental goals. For many of the poorest tenants, a significant part of the 
cost of moving is finding the funds to make a deposit on a new dwelling before 
they receive back their deposit on their current unit. If these tenants have to 
borrow in the illicit credit market or expend one of the finite favors they can 
call in from family or friends, the effective interest rate is likely to be 
exorbitant.114 In contrast, better-off tenants may either be able to pay the second 
 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1997); Creekside Apartments v. Poteat, 446 S.E.2d 826 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); see 
Lau v. Bautista, 598 P.2d 161 (Haw. 1979) (finding a statutory right to relocation assistance in 
such a case); cf. Allen v. Lee, 538 N.E.2d 1073 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming award of moving 
costs against landlord). 
113. Moreover, moving on the tenant’s own timetable is likely to be less costly, both in 
direct costs and in the tenant’s ability to obtain better new housing, than hurried moving should 
the tenant lose the initial case or the landlord effectively retaliate. See Chester Hartman & David 
Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, 14 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 461 (2003) 
(finding correlation between forced evictions and homelessness); Nan Marie Astone & Sara S. 
McLanahan, Family Structure, Residential Mobility, and School Dropout, 31 DEMOGRAPHY 575 
(1994) (finding that greater residential mobility explains much of the higher dropout rate of 
children in stepparent families). Evictions commonly bring severe collateral consequences. Mary 
Spector, Tenant Stories: Obstacles and Challenges Facing Tenants Today, 40 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 407 (2006). Thus, ease of moving is more likely to make departure appealing than it is to 
make the risk of withholding rent acceptable. 
114. Friends and family may not explicitly charge interest, but meeting their expectations 
of reciprocity may be costly and failing to do so even costlier if the tenant encounters another 
emergency. 
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deposit themselves or access cheaper credit.115 As a result, less-impoverished 
tenants, even if living in units with less-severe problems, may nonetheless be 
more willing to chance raising the warranty of habitability. Because it is poorer 
tenants that are most likely to live in substandard housing, the reduced 
probability that they will feel comfortable raising the warranty of habitability is 
likely to reduce the warranty’s effectiveness in remedying the worst housing 
conditions.   
Several additional observations are in order here. First, increasing the 
likelihood that tenants with meritorious claims will prevail does more than 
increase the likelihood that other tenants will become aware of the warranties: 
by increasing these aware tenants’ expectations of success it also increases the 
likelihood that they will elect to press claims based upon those warranties. 
Thus, the success rate of tenants in substandard dwellings is doubly important 
in persuading landlords to prefer repairing to litigation.116   
Second, this calculus is unlikely to yield the same result for all repairs or 
all landlords. Defects that are relatively inexpensive to fix, either because of 
their nature or because a particular landlord has an efficient system for making 
repairs, are more likely to be repaired even in a system that generates 
insufficient pressure to make costlier repairs cost-effective. As a result, the 
costs to the landlord of losing, and the value to the tenant of winning, a case 
under the warranty of habitability presumably should vary with the severity of 
the defect. The severity of a defect’s impact on the tenant’s enjoyment of the 
premises, however, will not always correspond to the cost of repairing the 
defect: exposed wiring could cause horrific harm to small children yet be 
inexpensive to repair, while repairing an isolated unevenness in the floor that 
creates a slight tripping hazard might require ripping up the entire floor and 
replacing support beams below. The warranty thus will tend to promote cost-
beneficial repairs just as a well-functioning market would. Some defects also 
may be more difficult or costly for tenants to prove, such as inadequate heat or 
some kinds of infestation. Landlords that might repair obvious holes in walls 
and exposed wiring might prefer to contest claims of defects that tenants cannot 
as readily photograph. This effect may mimic the effects of information costs in 
a market.117 
Third, the value to the tenant of any repairs increases with the time the 
tenant remains in the dwelling. Most repairs require many months of enjoyment 
 
115. To be sure, better-off tenants may have more possessions that would need to be 
moved and that could be lost or damaged in a move. They might also lose more wages if they 
must miss work to move. Nonetheless, these costs seem unlikely to have as severe a deterrent 
effect as the risk of homelessness would have on lower-income tenants. 
116. On the other hand, if many tenants prevail on unsound assertions of the warranty of 
habitability, landlords may conclude that repairing will not help to avoid such losses. 
117. See Rabin, supra note 23, at 580 (endorsing the implied warranty only for latent 
defects). 
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for raising the warranty to be cost-effective to the tenant. Therefore, the 
strength and duration of tenants’ protections against retaliatory evictions are 
pivotal to the results.118   
Finally, tenants’ behavior in these matters is unlikely to be consistently 
rational. As one long-time tenants’ lawyer remarked, “nothing gets people 
where they live like getting them where they live.”119 Thus, some tenants may 
be extremely risk averse and decline to pursue the warranty even if the actuarial 
value of doing so exceeds that of passivity. Conversely, some tenants may 
become so incensed about a landlord’s failure to repair—particularly if they see 
defects in their unit threatening the well-being of their children—that they may 
tilt at their landlords despite meager prospects for success. Nonetheless, given 
the high stakes, most tenants, particularly the poorest tenants, are likely to be 
quite risk-averse and hesitant to assert the warranty to confront their landlords 
over repairs unless the balance of risks and benefits seems heavily in favor of 
doing so. Absent a high likelihood of success or heavy financial penalties 
against landlords for the failure to repair, this will be difficult to achieve, 
particularly for tenants in the worst housing. 
b. Raising the Warranty to Defend Unintended Arrears 
Because tenants in defective housing may justifiably decline to raise the 
warranty of habitability as part of a deliberate strategy, the warranty’s 
effectiveness in improving housing conditions depends largely on tenants 
raising the warranty to defend non-intentional rent arrears. If the tenant lacks 
the money to pay the contract rent, she or he no longer has the option of staying 
and putting up with the defect. This makes the cost of moving less 
determinative: whether the tenant raises the warranty and fails or raises no 
defense at all, she or he is likely to have to move by approximately the same 
date.120 Even if the tenant prevails and then becomes subject to the landlord’s 
retaliation, she or he will surely have at least somewhat longer to move—as 
 
118. Many states prohibit retaliatory terminations to buttress code enforcement programs 
and the new tenants’ rights. URLTA § 5.101; see, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699–703 
(D.C. Cir. 1968). Proving the landlords’ motives is difficult, however, particularly for pro se 
tenants and those in systems without meaningful discovery. Kathleen Eldergill, The Connecticut 
Housing Court: An Initial Evaluation, 12 CONN. L. REV. 296, 311–12 (1980). Courts may 
presume the legitimacy of landlords’ terminations, in all cases or those not immediately following 
the tenants’ assertion of rights. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-20 (2006) (prohibiting 
rent increases, service cuts, or evictions within six months of a tenant’s efforts to enforce housing 
codes); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5720(2) (West 2000) (presuming non-retaliation if 
landlord waits ninety days to evict the tenant). 
119. Marilyn T. Mullane, now executive director of Michigan Legal Services, made this 
observation to the author while he was a law student. 
120. In many states, statute fixes the length of time a tenant has to move after the landlord 
wins possession. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5744 (West 2000) (allowing ten days 
to move after judgment). Thus, even if the tenant alienates the landlord or the court by raising the 
warranty, the court has little opportunity to punish the tenant. 
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well as whatever rent abatement she or he won. Thus, a tenant’s risk aversion, 
which plays a crucial role in determining which tenants will deliberately 
withhold rent, is largely irrelevant to whether she or he will raise the warranty 
to defend an inadvertent arrear. In addition, because these tenants need only 
learn of the implied warranty before they respond to the landlord’s eviction 
action, the courts have greater ability to ensure that tenants are informed in the 
early stages of the proceeding.121 
As a result, a rational tenant in substandard housing who has fallen behind 
on rent and is aware of the warranty of habitability will invoke it if the 
expected gains from appearing and defending exceed the costs of doing so 
(perhaps lost time from work, child care costs, or transportation expenses).122 
These direct costs are only a subset of the costs tenants contemplating 
deliberate withholding must weigh, meaning that a much more modest rate of 
success in the courts may justify expending modest litigation costs. On the 
other hand, rent abatements may have less value to involuntary defendants than 
to deliberate rent withholders. The latter will benefit from any rent abatement, 
large or small. An impoverished tenant who cannot afford to pay the contract 
rent, on the other hand, will benefit only from a rent abatement large enough to 
bring the cost of redeeming possession within her or his means. Thus, for 
example, an $800 abatement from a $1,000 rent claim may seem very favorable 
for the tenant. But if the tenant lacks the remaining $200 to redeem possession, 
she or he will have to move just as surely as if she or he had won no abatement 
at all. 
Impoverished tenants raising the warranty defensively after falling behind 
on their rent involuntarily are pivotal to the success of the warranty of 
habitability. This aligns tenants’ incentives well with the new regime’s housing 
quality aims: unlike the case of tenants contemplating deliberate withholding, 
involuntary defendants in the worst housing presumably have the greatest 
chances of success.123 And as involuntary defendants likely are poorer as a  
 
 
121. The Michigan Supreme Court found an innovative approach by inserting information 
on these rights on summonses used in Detroit for eviction cases and on optional form notices to 
quit that the courts made available to landlords. See Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 1019. After a 
few years, when reorganizing the Detroit courts, the justices did not require the new eviction court 
to retain the informational forms. See also Lynn E. Cunningham, Procedural Due Process Aspects 
of District of Columbia Eviction Procedures, 7 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 107, 113 (2005) 
(arguing for the requirement that landlords plead compliance with the implied warranty). 
122. Legally aware tenants in this position should raise the warranty whenever: 
(ProbTenant prevails in initial action x ValueDamages for prevailing tenant) + (ProbTenant prevails in initial action x 
ProbRepairs x ValueRepairs) > Direct CostLitigation.  
Indeed, this may understate the desirability of invoking the warranty because doing so might 
induce the landlord to settle for additional time to move. This serves the instrumental purpose of 
promoting repairs, as it at least modestly increases landlords’ costs of not repairing. 
123. To be sure, non-repairing landlords feel losses attributable to the warranty of 
habitability only if their tenants redeem possession. As noted, involuntary defendants may be less 
likely to do so.  
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group than deliberate rent withholders, their stronger incentives to raise the 
warranty comport with the reform’s redistributive and humanitarian goals.  
2. Courts’ Propensity to Rule for Tenants on Repair Defenses 
In addition to its direct impact on non-repairing landlords’ incentives, the 
rate of success that tenants of substandard housing enjoy when raising the 
warranty of habitability is crucial both to spreading word of that defense within 
the tenant community and to inducing other tenants to assert the warranty. 
Uniform application of new standards may be essential to improving housing 
quality without raising rents.124 
As an analytical matter, this should be fairly straightforward, as the new 
rules are not conceptually difficult to apply. Institutionally, however, the 
tenants’ rights revolution imposed stresses that the courts hearing eviction cases 
were ill-equipped to handle. Adapting to the new legal regime presented several 
distinct problems. First, hearing these cases demanded far greater resources 
than had been required to grant possession routinely to landlords under a legal 
regime in which tenants had few defenses. Second, trying disputes about 
housing conditions required very different skills than many of these courts 
previously had employed. And third, the judges hearing landlord-tenant 
disputes had to be willing to rule against landlords that had almost invariably 
prevailed in their courts under the prior regime. In this respect, the tenants’ 
rights revolution was at a distinct disadvantage relative to the welfare rights 
revolution. The latter created a new forum that it could design to meet its 
special needs, while the former tried to repurpose an existing forum with 
entrenched customs designed to perform very different functions.   
In the old regime, most tenants had no defenses to eviction.125 The few 
contested cases that did arise—typically challenges to the landlord’s 
accounting—generally could be resolved with documents. As a result, few 
judicial resources were required to resolve large numbers of cases quickly.  
The new defenses of failure to repair and retaliatory eviction required 
considerably more judicial resources. Because the condition of the tenant’s 
dwelling, or the landlord’s intent in terminating the tenancy, could raise 
genuine issues of fact, the right to a jury trial suddenly was no longer 
hypothetical. Although these cases remained quite simple even relative to the 
small civil cases and misdemeanors the same courts typically handled, the  
 
 
124. See Ackerman, supra note 86, at 1108 (arguing that comprehensive rather than 
selective code enforcement will increase housing quality but not rents). 
125. Marilyn Miller Mosier & Richard A. Soble, Modern Legislation, Metropolitan Court, 
Minuscule Results: A Study of Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 8, 10–
12 (1973); cf. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64–65 (1972) (discussing “those recurring cases 
where the tenant fails to pay rent or holds over after expiration of his tenancy and the issue in the 
ensuing litigation is simply whether he has paid or held over”).   
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increased demand for adjudicatory resources still confronted these courts with 
difficult choices.  
More broadly, appellate courts and legislatures imposed the implied 
warranty of habitability largely to make up for the failure of housing code 
enforcement. That failure resulted in significant part from a lack of 
adjudicatory resources for code enforcement. The new landlord-tenant regime 
shifted this excess demand for adjudicatory resources to the courts. Judicial 
adjudication, however, is much costlier than administrative processes: more 
people are involved, judges and some clerks likely are better paid than 
inspectors, suitable courtrooms must be constructed and maintained, and so on. 
The transfer therefore increased the aggregate shortfall in resources.126 Neither 
the legislatures, which could have created and funded new judgeships, nor the 
appellate courts, which might have diverted resources from other classes of 
cases, typically recognized this crucial condition to the success of the new legal 
regime they were creating.127 Similarly, neither gave much attention to the 
procedural reforms needed to make the courts accessible to unsophisticated pro 
se tenants.128 
Few of the courts given the responsibility of carrying out the policies 
embodied in the reforms had experience handling cases of major public policy 
import. Many had dockets dominated by traffic tickets, criminal arraignments, 
and routine debt collection actions. By necessity, these courts had become 
specialists more in the art of processing cases in volume than in resolving fine 
points of justice in individual cases.129 Judges themselves admitted they 
dispensed “assembly-line justice.”130 Some of the skills and techniques useful 
 
126. To the extent the problem with administrative housing code enforcement was 
corruption, transferring those responsibilities to the courts might have helped. Nonetheless, even 
without being corrupt, the landlord-tenant courts remain disproportionately vulnerable to influence 
from landlords and their lawyers, who typically are repeat players. 
127. Many other categories in their caseloads, however, had a far higher incidence of 
representation on both sides; those lawyers could be expected to exert political pressure if they felt 
their interests being slighted. See Richard S. Wells, Lawyers and the Allocation of Justice, in THE 
POLITICS OF LOCAL JUSTICE 149–53 (James R. Klonoski & Robert I. Mendelsohn eds., 1970). 
Other categories lacking representation, such as traffic tickets, already may have been handled on 
a mass basis with few additional resources available to be skimmed.   
128. By contrast, those seeking to reform government transfer programs have paid keen 
attention to procedural denials of substantive rights. See David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” 
Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1351–70 (2004) [hereinafter Super, Quiet Revolution]; Super, Invisible 
Hand, supra note 55, at 862–74. 
129. ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE 
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2007 STATE COURT CASELOADS 3 (2009) 
(Alternative subtitle: NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT), available 
at http://www.ncsc.org/topics/specialty-courts/traffic-courts-and-procedures/resource-guide.aspx 
(follow the hyperlink to the title) (showing that some states consign as much as 90 percent of their 
civil caseloads to specialized courts of limited jurisdiction). 
130. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 988 n.88; see id. at 987–88 (describing opacity of 
court procedures and unintelligibility of jargon on court forms); Anthony Fusco, Jr. et al., 
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for efficient processing of large numbers of cases were antithetical to the goal 
of finding facts, even relatively simple ones, in each case. The rapid use of 
jargon and opaque procedures131 may seem relatively benign when the 
bewildered tenants had no defenses to raise. Similarly, when the result in the 
courtroom was virtually a foregone conclusion, having clerks explain that result 
to parties and encourage them to go home—leave the court to enter a default 
judgment—could save everyone time.132   
For tenants to assert defenses based on the warranty or retaliation, ef-
fectively, however, they must understand the proceedings. The amounts of 
money involved are likely to make retained counsel infeasible. Although the 
warranty came into being at about the apogee of legal services funding, these 
programs never had the resources to represent more than a small fraction of the 
number of tenants being evicted from substandard housing.133 And those 
tenants with meritorious defenses commonly are among the least 
sophisticated.134 Many of these tenants inevitably become confused at times, 
requiring judges and clerks to decide how much they are comfortable 
explaining consistent with their view of the adversary process.135 
Finally, implementing the new tenants’ defenses required a profound 
transformation of courthouse culture. Larger landlords and many landlords’ 
lawyers are repeat players, well known to judges and clerks.136 Under the old 
regime, the landlord receiving judgment in virtually every case was a part of 
the pattern governing their interactions, almost as much as the salutation “your 
Honor.” With few cases requiring judicial discretion, some judges and clerks 
may have seen little harm in relaxing the barriers separating them from 
landlords and their counsel. These relationships may have seemed symbiotic: 
cooperative relationships with landlords and their lawyers could facilitate the 
 
Chicago’s Eviction Court: A Tenants’ Court of No Resort, 17 URB. L. ANN. 93, 105 (1979) 
(describing tenants’ befuddlement at court procedures). 
131. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 987–88 
132. See infra note 231 and accompanying text. 
133. Even with a legal aid office across the hallway from the Detroit Landlord-Tenant 
Court, fewer than 10 percent of tenants in 1975 had lawyers. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 993, 
1000. Legal services never came close to being a “responsive entitlement” committed to serving 
all eligible people with meritorious cases. See David A. Super, The Political Economy of 
Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633, 654 (2004) (distinguishing between programs like legal 
services that serve only an arbitrary number of people and those in which eligibility assures an 
applicant service) [hereinafter Super, Political Economy]. 
134. The lowest-income tenants, who typically live in the worst units, also are more likely 
to be marginally literate, as literacy correlates with earning capacity. 
135. The substance of landlord-tenant law is far simpler than that of public welfare 
programs’ rules, but most eviction courts’ procedures are more challenging for inexperienced 
tenants than the inquisitorial model of public benefits fair hearings. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.15(l)-(q) 
(2010) (establishing simple procedures for hearings in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP), with the hearing officer broadly responsible for ensuring full development of 
the issues). 
136. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 120 n.59 (1974) (quoting Mosier & Soble, supra note 125). 
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expeditious disposition of large dockets. Elected judges may have come to 
expect the support of the landlords’ bar, and that bar may have seemed a 
natural pool from which to draw new judges. Repeat litigants may be among 
the relatively few non-court personnel from whom judges may hope to receive 
the respect and deference that often must substitute for financial compensation. 
Lacking many of the trappings, and interesting cases, of higher courts, this 
value should not be underestimated. Thus, some courts may be as vulnerable to 
“capture” by repeat players nominally subject to their jurisdiction as are 
administrative agencies.137 Even when the courts were not dealing with repeat 
players, the assumption that landlords were entitled to win virtually all cases 
may have induced judges and clerks to assist confused landlords in making out 
the elements of their claims.138  
Although landlords had no legally cognizable interest in a substantive 
legal regime that assured them of virtually complete success, the social reliance 
interests on all sides likely were immense. For the courts to reassert formal 
roles, much less hold trials on matters that previously had been routine and 
render judgments against familiar landlords, risked that landlords would 
perceive the courts’ actions as personal slights. This inevitably required 
considerable readjustment by all concerned. And some judges might have 
found demeaning the prospect of simplifying and explaining the proceedings to 
make them more intelligible to unsophisticated pro se tenants.   
In addition to being trustees for finite pools of adjudicatory resources, 
courts also can be seen as vendors of eviction services to landlords. Landlords 
can remove their tenants through the courts or through (generally illegal) self-
help methods. Although some landlords may always choose the courts as a 
matter of principle, others may choose based on relative costs and benefits. As 
such, the courts are vulnerable to competitive pressures. If the new tenants’ 
rights made evictions too burdensome, landlords might abandon the courts and 
seek to evict their tenants themselves.139 Judges may understandably want to 
avoid the resulting chaos and violence that would likely entail. Judges also may 
resent the loss of prestige if litigants abandon their courts. 
Thus, instead of focusing solely on adapting the courts to implement the 
new reforms, judges had to worry about the effect the reforms might have on 
their dockets, on their roles, and on the attitudes of landlords. These worries 
undoubtedly diminished the enthusiasm with which many courts welcomed 
 
137. See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
1183, 1194–98 (1973) (explaining how administrative agencies are often captured by the 
industries they regulate). 
138. See infra note 231; cf., e.g., Neal v. Fisher, 541 A.2d 1314, 1320 (Md. 1988) 
(describing trial judge’s declaration that he could empathize with the landlord because he was a 
landlord himself).   
139. See Randy G. Gerchick, Comment, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction 
Process a Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV. 759 
(1994) (analyzing summary eviction procedures as substitutes for self-help eviction methods). 
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their new roles implementing public policies against bad housing conditions 
and in favor of increased bargaining power for tenants. 
3. Assumptions About Housing Markets and Poverty 
Achieving any of the reforms’ instrumental goals depends on housing 
economics. In particular, any plausible scenario in which the reforms could 
improve housing conditions, redistribute wealth, or even ameliorate 
humanitarian crises depends on a plausible explanation of why low-income 
tenants cannot obtain better housing by spending more in the existing market. 
The reforms’ advocates divided between two theories. Some maintained that 
the housing market is somehow flawed in such a way that increased spending—
at least within the ranges of which most low-income tenants are capable—
cannot reliably bring better housing conditions. In this view, rents exceed those 
that a well-functioning market would produce,140 and landlords are far more 
profitable than generally recognized.141 The task, then, is to redistribute some 
of that surplus to tenants. The alternative explanation is that the market reflects 
low-income tenants’ preferences: as much as they might dislike their decrepit 
dwellings, they would dislike even more the reductions in food, utility service, 
or other necessities required to pay for any increase in their consumption of 
housing. Put simply, low-income tenants suffer bad housing conditions because 
they are too poor to afford anything more.    
On closer examination, the market failure theory proves difficult to 
support except in small submarkets or for relatively short intervals. It also has a 
paradoxical effect on tenants’ propensity to raise the implied warranty. Yet if 
one concludes that low-income tenants’ poverty is the reason they cannot avoid 
bad housing conditions, the warranty of habitability could easily cause them 
more harm than good. And if housing markets operate competitively in the 
medium and long term, pressing landlords to repair could cause units to depart, 
either upward or downward, from the low-cost rental market.  
a. Bad Housing Conditions as a Result of Market Failure 
Those claiming failure in the housing markets had some difficulty 
specifying the nature of that failure. Some argued that many urban housing 
markets had low vacancy rates and suggested that this meant tenants suffered 
from a lack of competition among landlords. A true lack of competition—a 
market controlled by one or a few suppliers who can insist on prices above 
competitive equilibrium—is indeed a market failure, but ownership of rental 
 
140. See Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 977 n.46 (asserting that rents “are always more 
than double [the] value of services necessary to maintain the house”); Ted R. Vaughan, Landlord-
Tenant Relations in a Low-Income Area, in TENANTS AND THE URBAN HOUSING CRISIS 77–83 
(Stephen Burghardt ed., 1972). 
141. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 978. 
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housing is more heterogeneous than that in some other major consumer 
markets.142 Low vacancy rates do not necessarily result from a lack of 
competition. Vacant housing causes losses for its owners, which they naturally 
seek to avoid.143 A market with low vacancy rates may be one in which supply 
has matched demand closely. Moreover, many cities actually had relatively 
high vacancy rates during the period when the implied warranty was winning 
recognition.144 
Others argued that low-income tenants lacked the sophistication to 
bargain effectively with their landlords, suffering a kind of information 
failure.145 Thus, whether landlord or tenant is responsible for repairs would 
matter because transaction costs would prevent tenants from bargaining with 
their landlords in a Coasean manner for an optimal level of maintenance. 
The theory that tenants lacked bargaining capacity creates something of a 
paradox. As noted above, the implied warranty of habitability’s effectiveness 
depends in significant part on tenants’ sophistication in learning about the 
warranty and navigating court procedures to assert it effectively. The more 
arduous those procedures are, the more they will deny relief to tenants whose 
lack of sophistication has exposed them to the information failures 
hypothesized to justify the imposition of the warranty. Thus, if the market 
failure hypothesis is correct, the warranty of habitability will prove ineffectual 
because tenants in substandard housing will be unlikely to raise it 
successfully.146    
A more sophisticated argument for market failure focuses on time. 
Housing takes a fairly long time to enter the market, leaving the short-term 
housing supply relatively inelastic.147 Some of the reforms’ advocates argued 
that this inelasticity could be fairly persistent due to land-use controls, building 
codes, expensive union “featherbedding,” and other factors.148 They did not 
identify the surge in demand to which the market was failing to respond: if 
anything, the decades following World War II saw a rapid shrinkage in demand 
for rental housing in central cities, as much of the middle class became 
suburban homeowners. Moreover, this theory creates another paradox because 
 
142. See Ackerman, supra note 86, at 1099–100, 1149–50. 
143. See Rabin, supra note 23, at 576. 
144. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH, 
1980 NATIONAL HOUSING PRODUCTION REPORT 43 (1980). 
145. Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low-Income Housing: 
“Milking” and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 485, 497–98 (1987). 
146. In other words, the same skills that would allow more sophisticated tenants to raise the 
implied warranty of habitability successfully will, under this market failure hypothesis, allow 
them to avoid living in defective housing in the first place. 
147. Conversely, discrimination may deny slum landlords an alternative, more upscale 
market for their units even if they repair those units. Middle-income renters will decline to live in 
housing in “bad neighborhoods” even if  that housing is otherwise desirable. Ackerman, supra note 
86, at 1102. 
148. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 977. 
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tenants’ willingness to move affects their propensity to assert the warranty. If 
tenants’ positions in the market are precarious, they presumably will be highly 
averse to moving. A tenant forced to move rapidly after losing an eviction case 
will be among the most vulnerable to short-term market conditions. This 
paradox is partially ameliorated for impoverished tenants raising the warranty 
when other financial setbacks make them involuntary defendants in eviction 
proceedings. These tenants still, however, must master court procedures suf-
ficiently to assert the warranty effectively in defending their failure to pay rent.  
b. Bad Housing Conditions as a Result of Poverty 
If low-income tenants’ inability to secure better housing is attributed not 
to market failure but simply to their poverty, the warranty of habitability would 
potentially cause low-income tenants to increase their consumption of housing. 
In theory, regulatory policy that causes low-income tenants to increase their 
consumption of housing need not be redistributive.149 It could, instead, 
represent a judgment that they would be better off in superior housing even if 
they had to sacrifice other expenditures to pay for it.150 Yet forcing tenants to 
endure hunger in order to live in better apartments is hardly consistent with the 
1960s notion of expanding individual rights—it is at once paternalistic, 
inefficient, and cruel. Therefore, the implied warranty of habitability likely 
would not have attracted any significant number of adherents absent some 
argument that low-income tenants could receive better housing without 
reducing their ability to purchase other necessities. The implied warranty’s 
advocates developed several theories about why landlords under some 
circumstances might be compelled to absorb the added costs of improved 
maintenance, neither raising rents nor shrinking the supply of low-rent 
housing;151 critics staunchly rejected these views.152   
Allowing low-income tenants to consume more housing for the same cost 
could happen if the housing supply function shifted to provide more housing at 
each price.153 Such a shift would occur with a reduction in the costs of 
production. Federal housing policy sought to increase production, but with 
ambiguous effects. During the three decades after World War II, the federal 
government subsidized the cost of supplying housing by constructing public 
housing. The white middle class’s heavily subsidized abandonment of the inner 
cities similarly swelled the supply of rental housing. Beginning in the Nixon 
 
149. Ackerman, supra note 86, at 1097. 
150. Neil K. Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique of the Ackerman Analysis of 
Housing Code Enforcement, 82 YALE L.J. 1175, 1175–76 (1973). 
151. Ackerman, supra note 86, at 1177; Bruce Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and 
Redistribution Policy: A Reply to Professor Komesar, 82 YALE. L.J. 1194, 1198 (1973).  
152. Komesar, supra note 150, at 1183; Rabin, supra note 23, at 580; RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 16.6 (6th ed. 2003). 
153. In other words, the supply curve would shift to the right. 
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Administration, however, the federal government began to change from 
subsidizing supply to subsidizing individual tenants’ purchases of housing 
through Section 8 vouchers and certificates.154 This allowed a minority of low-
income tenants—those receiving subsidies—to pay more for housing without 
sacrificing other expenditures, but it also increased aggregate demand, 
counteracting the effects of the growth in supply. Some writers suggested that 
social segregation, on the other hand, would stifle demand for housing in areas 
regarded as slums and inhibit landlords from exiting to compete in higher-
priced markets.155 
The courts adopting the tenants’ rights reforms had no way to affect the 
supply of low-rent housing directly.156 State legislatures might have, but state-
level social spending initiatives of this scale were rare in this period, and the 
federal government had assumed the mantle of housing financing. Thus, states’ 
ability to increase low-income tenants’ consumption of housing depended on 
finding and exploiting some flaw in the housing market that would prevent 
landlords from charging low-income tenants more for improved housing.157 It 
also presumably depended on not adversely affecting the supply of low-rent 
housing. 
At least three features of the housing market in some places may prevent 
landlords from passing along to tenants the costs of repairs compelled under the 
warranty of habitability.158 First, some urban areas have rent control. The 
fraction of the low-income housing market covered by rent control, however, 
was modest even when the tenants’ rights revolution was taking shape and has 
steadily declined since.159 Still, if landlords must make repairs and may not by 
law increase rents, they must either absorb the cost of the repairs or take the 
unit off the market.  
Second, a similar effect can be achieved through fixed public assistance 
grant levels. If the maximum monthly welfare grant for a family of three is 
$400, and a substantial fraction of low-income tenants receive welfare, 
landlords may not be able to charge more than that amount for two-bedroom 
units whose size or location will not attract middle-income renters.160 Thus, the 
 
154. Super, Laboratories, supra note 37, at 585; KATZ, supra note 59, at 129–32 (2001). 
155. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 86, at 1102. 
156. Indirectly, however, improved maintenance increases supply by extending the life of 
rental units. Kennedy, supra note 145, at 499–501.  
157. See Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (assuming 
but not explaining such market conditions). 
158. Some posit that the supply of housing dropping out of higher-cost housing markets 
will deny landlords the bargaining power to raise rents above their current expenses, particularly 
in declining neighborhoods. Kennedy, supra note 145, at 487–88.   
159. D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 285 
(2006).  
160. To be sure, landlords could increase the rent for a unit to the level of the maximum 
welfare grant for the next-larger family, effectively forcing more crowding. As discussed more 
fully infra Part III.C.2, this would convert one kind of bad housing, decaying conditions, into 
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demand function is effectively discontinuous, with demand in the lowest 
segment almost perfectly elastic with respect to price at the levels 
corresponding to public assistance grant levels.161 The effect is somewhat 
similar to that of rent control: if the warranty compels a landlord to make 
repairs and the elasticity of demand at the public-assistance-grant level prevents 
the landlord from recovering those costs, the landlord may have to choose 
between absorbing the repair cost and making enough improvements to the unit 
to appeal to a higher segment of the rental market.   
Finally, a large proportion of landlords’ costs are fixed. The landlord 
incurs the cost of capital invested in the unit, property taxes, insurance, roof 
repairs, and at least enough heat to keep the pipes from freezing whether the 
unit is occupied or not. Therefore, in the short term, landlords have a strong 
incentive not to raise rents to the point where the unit might fall vacant, as even 
a very low rent should more than cover the unit’s marginal occupancy costs. 
Even in the medium term, a very slight rate of return on the landlord’s original 
investment might be superior to exiting the market.162 Thus, in a housing 
market with a substantial vacancy rate, the landlord in the near term may have 
to absorb at least a substantial portion of the additional costs of repairs.   
None of these is altogether satisfactory. The first two affect only small 
segments of the rental housing market, and none of the three is reliable beyond 
the short term. In addition, even if these or other factors prevent landlords from 
passing along the full cost of additional repairs, tenants may not be better off. 
Low-income tenants with very tight budgets may face serious hardship if their 
housing costs increase, even if the value they receive far exceeds the price.163 
Getting a $5,000 ocean cruise for $100 sounds like a great deal—unless that 
$100 is needed to prevent a utility shut-off, to pay for cardiac medication, or 
the like. Moreover, even where market conditions prevent increases in price, 
they typically lead to a reduction in the number of units entering the market 
when the costs of production rise. Even if landlords could not raise rents in the 
near term, a reduction in the supply of low-cost housing could result in 
overcrowding, homelessness, and tenants exiting the affected market to 
compete for housing in higher-cost or physically remote rental markets. 
 
another, overcrowding. 
161. A similar effect could be achieved by assuming absolute uniformity in the housing 
stock and in the effectiveness of regulations requiring better maintenance. Ackerman, supra note 
86, at 1109. 
162. Id. at 1103. 
163. See id. at 1120. The total monetary value conferred on tenants, or the value of tenants’ 
housing purchases, may improve if the warranty compels landlords to make repairs that improve 
the quality of the unit by more than the cost they pass along to tenants. See also Richard Craswell, 
Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 361, 398 (1991). Tenants’ aggregate welfare, however, could readily decline if the 
incremental value of the housing gained is less than that of the goods or services sacrificed to 
purchase it. Narrow, monetary calculations of low-income people’s well-being can stoke 
humanitarians’ suspicions of redistributionalists. See supra Part I.A.4. 
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Even if landlords cannot pass along all, or even some, of the cost of 
repairs, they have two additional options in the medium and long term besides 
defying the warranty or making the repairs the warranty commands. They may 
disinvest in the property to the point that it falls out of the rental market 
completely through abandonment or arson. Or they may make substantial new 
investments in the property to move it out of the lowest-rent segment of the 
market.  
Thus, the landlords’ decision function described above is incomplete—it 
considers only two of at least four options.164 To improve the lives of tenants, 
the option of repairing must not only become more attractive to landlords than 
ignoring the implied warranty, it must also prevail over both disinvestment and 
moving the unit into a higher-cost housing market, either as a rental or through 
conversion to a condominium or cooperative. Indeed, in order to achieve a 
socially beneficial outcome, enough landlords must decide to repair to make the 
improvement in tenants’ lives offset the harm experienced by those 
unsuccessful in asserting the warranty of habitability, who will have forfeited 
the economic and noneconomic costs of litigation and moving, as well as the 
adverse consequences of reducing the supply of low-cost housing.165   
Here, too, a paradox arises affecting tenants’ propensity to assert the 
warranty. If a significant number of landlords remove units from the market 
rather than repair them, the supply of low-rent housing will decline, the cost of 
moving will increase, and fewer tenants will be inclined to assert the warranty. 
More generally, as the low-rent housing market tightens, any economic 
pressures on landlords to maintain their dwellings as a way of attracting 
tenants, as well as market pressures not to raise rents to cover the costs of 
repairs or otherwise, will largely disappear. Decrepit housing may well 
disappear, which may satisfy those who saw the warranty as a response to 
urban blight. But the results will bitterly disappoint redistributivists and 
humanitarians, who will see the benefit of improved housing accrue not to low-
income tenants but to middle- and upper-income gentrifiers. 
C. Conclusion 
The implied warranty’s success in improving decrepit housing units or in 
improving the well-being of their tenants depends upon a series of factors, 
several of which are highly problematic. Those tenants most affected may not 
be aware of their rights, may lack the sophistication to assert those rights 
 
164. Landlords could also sell their units to other landlords who can make repairs or 
prosecute eviction actions more efficiently. This may resolve some borderline cases but still 
leaves the overall picture essentially unchanged. 
165. When the implied warranty was new, one could imagine the government making up 
for the loss of supply of low-income housing. See Ackerman, supra note 86, at 1113–19. This, 
however, might have proved administratively difficult and could be less efficient than a direct 
cash transfer program. Komesar, supra note 150, at 1178 n.8, 1180–83.   
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effectively, or may decline to raise the warranty either because they are 
unwilling to risk having to move or because they prefer moving to investing 
resources fighting over their current abode. The warranty’s effectiveness 
therefore is likely to depend heavily on having tenants raise the warranty 
defensively after falling behind on their rent. Even then, the ability of low-level 
courts to transform the way they handle landlord-tenant cases is pivotal.   
II. 
FLAWS IN THE NEW REGIME 
Like the welfare rights revolution, the tenants’ rights revolution suffered 
from deep normative ambivalence that led to rules sharply limiting its practical 
impact. Courts and legislatures did not match the attention they devoted to the 
broad strokes of reforming substantive landlord-tenant law with similar focus 
on the finer points of the doctrine or the procedural and institutional steps 
required to ensure that the implied warranty would improve either substandard 
housing or the lives of the tenants of those units. The ensuing problems have 
resulted in extremely low rates of success for tenants with meritorious claims 
under the implied warranty of habitability. In particular, these policies have 
tended to prevent tenants from raising the implied warranty defensively. Given 
the previously described difficulty of inducing tenants to challenge their 
landlords’ repair records affirmatively, excluding impoverished tenants 
defending nonpayment actions has severely undermined the new regime of 
landlord-tenant law, rendering it irrelevant or even counter-productive with 
respect to many of the problems it set out to address. Moreover, the regime’s 
failure has disproportionately afflicted the lowest-income tenants whose plight 
helped drive the transformation of the substantive law. 
Section A describes some important formal limitations on tenants’ ability 
to assert the implied warranty of habitability, one substantive, the other 
procedural. Section B then summarizes what is known about how the courts 
have actually handled eviction cases under the new legal regime. It finds that an 
array of procedural obstacles have rendered the implied warranty of habitability 
almost irrelevant in practice, with tenants prevailing far too rarely to induce 
other tenants to learn about and raise the new defenses or to induce landlords to 
increase their maintenance efforts.   
A. Formal Limitations on the New Rules 
An initial substantive challenge the new regime faced came from 
landlords’ efforts to waive the implied warranty through explicit lease terms. 
Competition for lease terms is rare even in otherwise competitive rental 
housing markets;166 this lack of competition should allow many landlords to 
impose such terms. Tenants in the worst housing, who may be the least 
 
166. Rabin, supra note 23, at 582–83. 
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sophisticated and have fewer alternatives, may be the most susceptible to 
demands that they sign such leases. Many states recognized that reading an 
implied warranty of habitability into leases that was waivable would 
accomplish little.167 Yet even unenforceable lease terms may compound 
tenants’ confusion about their rights.168 Only a few jurisdictions sought 
affirmatively to deter landlords from including such terms.169 
Even without these lease terms, however, the new regime of landlord-
tenant law created asymmetry between landlord and tenant in two subtle but 
important respects.170 First, many jurisdictions impose substantive rules that 
effectively prevent tenants from challenging the landlord’s breach of the 
implied warranty of habitability without deliberate preparation.171 Such rules 
make the defense difficult for a hard-pressed tenant who misses a rental 
payment and must defend a possessory action for nonpayment of rent. Second, 
most jurisdictions require tenants raising warranty of habitability defenses to 
deposit with the court contract rent as it comes due. This effectively excuses the 
landlord’s breach of her or his covenant of repair unless the tenant continues to 
perform her or his covenant to pay rent.   
Although contract law has never been perfectly symmetrical—and 
certainly is not so today—none of these rules has obvious roots in contract law. 
Instead, they appear to be products of social engineering or hesitation about 
imposing the warranty of habitability. On the other hand, they are not 
necessarily offensive to the contractualist, or modernizing, vision of the new 
regime of landlord-tenant law. After all, the warranty of habitability was read 
into contracts reached between landlord and tenant that contained no such 
provision. Each of these rules could be framed as additional implied warranties 
from the tenant or as limitations on the landlord’s warranty that the law reads 
into residential leases.  
 
167. See, e.g., Leardi v. Brown, 474 N.E.2d 1094, 1099–1100 (Mass. 1985); Fair v. 
Negley, 390 A.2d 240, 243 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); Curtis J. Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 
74 COLUM. L. REV. 791 (1974) (describing how judges find ways to rule in favor of tenants when 
their leases waive rights to which they are entitled); Bailey Kuklin, On the Knowing Inclusion of 
Unenforceable Contract and Lease Terms, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 845, 886 n.132 (1988). But see P.H. 
Inv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah 1991) (allowing waivers); Odneal v. Wolfe, 1980 WL 
351332, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (treating tenant’s move into the premises as admission of their 
habitability); cf., Pierre v. Williams, 431 N.Y.S.2d 249, 250–51 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980) (enforcing 
lease term waiving right to jury trial). 
168. Kuklin, supra note 167, at 868. 
169. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 554.633(1)(a), 554.636 (West 2005); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.13(E), 5321.14(A) (LexisNexis 2004). 
170. Some states imposed other limitations on the new regime, such as limits on which 
defects could justify a defense to a nonpayment action. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 
92.052–.058 (West 2007). 
171. An extreme version of this approach is Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 160, 168 (Wash. 
1973), in which the court prohibited the defensive invocation of the warranty of habitability unless 
the tenant is entitled to a complete rent abatement, or somehow calculated and paid the portion of 
rent not meriting abatement. 
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The impact of these rules on the tenants’ rights revolution’s instrumental 
goals, however, is profound. Although other factors intervened to help reshape 
the low end of the housing market and the lives of low-income renters, these 
rules alone likely would have sufficed to distort severely the impact of the 
tenants’ rights revolution. This Section describes these rules and considers how 
they may rearrange the incentives analyzed in Part II above. 
1. The Requirement that Rent Withholding Be Deliberate 
Most states effectively require tenants invoking the implied warranty of 
habitability to demonstrate that their sole motive in failing to pay rent was to 
raise repair issues.172 These rules commonly are described as requiring the 
tenant to show “good faith.” Some commentators suggest that tenants who have 
failed to pay rent for some reason other than the landlord’s failure to repair 
should perhaps be barred from raising the habitability defense as a “legal 
afterthought.”173 Some states enact such a bar explicitly, even requiring an 
affidavit that the tenant has taken five specified preparatory steps.174 One state 
imposes monetary penalties on tenants who withhold rent absent strict 
compliance with statutory conditions.175   
The most common method of ascertaining that the tenant’s invocation of 
the warranty was deliberate is to require the tenant to prove that she or he gave 
the landlord notice of any defects alleged.176 The Restatement declares that the 
 
172. See, e.g., 280 Broad, LLC v. Adams, 2006 WL 2790909 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) 
(denying rent abatement to tenant whose furnace exploded because economic difficulties 
contributed to nonpayment of rent). The state might require proof that the tenant lodged a 
complaint with code enforcement agencies. See Eldergill, supra note 118, at 306. The state might 
require the tenant to demonstrate that she or he has the money required to pay the rent. See, e.g., 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.530(3) (West 2006) (establishing municipal escrow account for 
this purpose). One court, however, held that tendering payment to the landlord waived the 
warranty. See Eldergill, supra note 118, at 309. 
173. See, e.g., Brakel, supra note 83, at 569. But cf. 279 4th Ave. Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Mollett, 
898 A.2d 1036, 1039 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (reversing dismissal of tenant’s habitability 
defense entered because tenant’s rent payments were late).  
174. See Chernin v. Welchans, 844 F.2d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 1988) (describing Ohio’s 
procedure). 
175. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.058(a) (West 2007). 
176. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.052(a) (West 2007); URLTA § 4.101(a); Jesse 
v. Lindsley, 233 P.3d 1, 7 (Idaho 2008); Glasoe v. Trinkle, 479 N.E.2d 915, 920 (Ill. 1985); Dulin 
v. Sowell, 919 So. 2d 1010, 1012 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005); Chiodini v. Fox, 207 S.W.3d 174, 176 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2006); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Marini v. 
Ireland, 265 A.2d 526, 535 (N.J. 1970); N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Roberts, Nos. 570853-01, 02-
026/027, 2002 WL 759637, at *1 (N.Y. App. Term Apr. 16, 2002); Geyer v. Frank, No. CA84-06-
074, 1985 WL 8144, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1985); Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 906 (Pa. 
1979); McIntyre ex rel. Howard v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 816 A.2d 1204, 1208 n.9 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2003); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 210 (Vt. 1984); MICH. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTION 
100.01 (2010); 49 AM. JUR. 2D, Landlord & Tenant, § 450 (2010); SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 34,  
§ 3:24 (1980); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY § 10.6 (2d ed. 2005). But 
see OR. REV. STAT. § 90.360 (2009); Gennings v. Newton, 567 So. 2d 637 (La. Ct. App. 1990) 
(rejecting notice requirement); In re Estate of Jorden, 800 N.Y.S.2d 490, 496 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 
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landlord must “keep the leased property in a condition that meets the 
requirements of governing health, safety, and housing codes,”177 but grants 
tenants remedies only when the “the landlord does not correct his failure within 
a reasonable time after being requested to do so.”178 These requirements 
migrated to the contract side of landlord-tenant law from its tort side, which 
imposed liability for the landlord’s negligent disregard of known defects.179 
Some courts have required more formal notice than many tenants are likely to 
provide180 or sanctioned tenants for raising valid defenses without having given 
their landlords notice.181 
2. Landlords’ Protective Orders 
Probably the most important formal limitations on the new regime of 
landlord-tenant law are landlords’ protective orders (LPOs). LPOs are court 
orders or statutory requirements that tenants deposit rent with the court during 
the pendency of these actions as a condition to being heard on their defenses182 
or receiving a jury trial.183 For more affluent tenants with incomes sufficient to 
make these payments, LPOs may be mere nuisances. But for low-income 
tenants, those most likely to live in slum housing, these orders may effectively 
keep the implied warranty out of court. This frustrates the instrumental, 
redistributive, and humanitarian goals of the new landlord-tenant regime. 
Moreover, because these orders find little precedent in other areas of contract 
law, they arguably preserve some of the exceptionalism that the reforms sought 
to purge from landlord-tenant law. 
 
2005); Miller v. C.W. Myers Trading Post, Inc., 355 S.E.2d 189 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (finding 
notice not required for many defects); SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 34, § 3:16. 
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD & TENANT § 5.5(1) (1977). 
178. Id. § 5.5(4); see Moser v. Cline, 214 S.W.3d 390, 395 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (awarding 
landlord double rent because tenant failed to show that delay in repairing sewer was 
unreasonable); Chess v. Muhammad, 430 A.2d 928, 930 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1981) (per 
curiam) (finding no breach because delay in repairs not unreasonable). 
179. See Michael J. Davis & Phillip E. DeLaTorre, A Fresh Look at Premises Liability as 
Affected by the Warranty of Habitability, 59 WASH. L. REV. 141, 157 (1984). 
180. See, e.g., Dugan v. Milledge, 494 A.2d 1203, 1206 (Conn. 1985) (affirming dismissal 
of tenants’ claims because tenant could not prove a prior complaint to housing inspectors); Myrah 
v. Campbell, 163 P.3d 679, 683 (Utah. Ct. App. 2007) (finding “informal emails” and telephone 
calls insufficient). 
181. See, e.g., Landmarks Restoration Corp. v. Gwardyak, 485 N.Y.S.2d 917, 918–19 
(N.Y. City Ct. 1985) (awarding attorneys’ fees to landlord despite tenant’s meritorious defense 
and usual rule denying attorneys’ fees in contract cases). 
182. See, e.g., URLTA § 4.105 (“In [the] event [the tenant counterclaims for money under 
the rental agreement or the Act] the court from time to time may order the tenant to pay into court 
all or part of the rent accrued and thereafter accruing, and shall determine the amount due to each 
party. The party to whom a net amount is owed shall be paid first from the money paid into court, 
and the balance by the other party.”). 
183. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2) (2009).  
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a. The Genesis of LPOs 
LPO requirements in many jurisdictions have extensive histories going 
back long before the recognition of the implied warranty of habitability and the 
related defense of retaliatory eviction184—prior to which tenants had few 
defenses available in eviction cases. Where “the only issue is whether the 
allegations of the complaint are true,”185 an LPO has the effect only of 
requiring tenants to pay an undeniable obligation.186 Similarly, when a court 
requires rent payments on appeal after a trial has found that rent is owed, it 
merely echoes the court’s findings and provides the landlord security against 
loss during the period the appeal is pending.187 And although most jurisdictions 
substantially rewrote their statutes on eviction procedure at the time they 
recognized reforms, having LPO requirements in their previous statutes prob-
ably made these states more likely to continue to impose LPOs without careful 
consideration of their compatibility with the new regime.188   
 
184. See, e.g., MICH. REV. STAT., ch. 123, § 8303 (1846). 
185. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 63 (1972). 
186. Even before the tenants’ rights revolution, tenants could argue constructive eviction or 
challenge the landlord’s assertion about the rent level. Thus, even under the old regime, “[o]f 
course, it is possible for [LPOs] to be applied so as to deprive a tenant of a proper hearing in 
specific situations . . . .” Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 65.  
187. See, e.g., Cooks v. Fowler (Cooks I), 437 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (finding that 
the equities are more likely to favor appeal bonds than pretrial LPOs); Bell v. Tsintolas Realty 
Co., 430 F.2d 474, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1970). But see Cooks v. Fowler (Cooks II), 459 F.2d 1269, 
1272, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“Judicial protection of the landlord, whether pretrial or post-trial, 
can be justified only within the area of fair compensation for the possession he loses during the 
period of litigation. A protective order is unsustainable insofar as it requires the tenant to deposit 
as security more than the landlord could legitimately claim on that account.”). Bonds imposed on 
appeal from courts that do not afford the parties full trials present a somewhat different situation. 
Jurisdictions utilizing these procedures typically refer eviction actions to quasi-judicial 
magistrates for initial determinations. Unsuccessful parties may then “appeal” to a higher court, 
where they receive a trial de novo. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-332(a), (d) 
(LexisNexis 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-32 (2009). Some of the parties’ basic procedural rights, 
in particular the right to a jury trial, may only be made available on this “appeal.” This caused one 
court to invalidate these “appeal bonds,” Usher v. Waters Ins. & Realty Co., 438 F. Supp. 1215, 
1220–21 (W.D.N.C. 1977), leading the state to exempt indigent tenants from part of the 
requirement. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-34(c1). 
Access to appeal can be important to counter some of the problems described infra Part II.B. 
See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 74–79 (invalidating on equal protection grounds an Oregon statute 
requiring tenant-appellants to post bond for double rent to perfect an appeal); Fed. Nat’l Mortg. 
Ass’n v. Wingate, 273 N.W.2d 456, 460–61 (Mich. 1979) (overturning requirement that tenants 
seeking to appeal eviction orders make large cash deposits); Cooks I, 437 F.2d at 673; Cooks II, 
459 F.2d at 1275–76 (vacating a trial court’s order that a tenant pay the full contract rent into court 
as an appeal bond despite serious defects in the premises). 
188. Commentators have been of little help. Even one of the more thorough critiques of 
URLTA mentions LPOs only in passing. Richard E. Blumberg & Brian Quinn Robbins, Beyond 
URLTA: A Program for Achieving Real Tenant Goals, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 9 n.39 
(1976). Another major article on the tenants’ rights reforms offers an almost exclusively 
descriptive summary of the then-existing law on LPOs. Myron Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty 
of Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising New Issues, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1444, 1473–80, 1482–87 
(1974). The one discussion specifically treating the escrow requirement in landlord-tenant 
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LPOs may be attempts to appease landlords upset by the recognition of 
implied covenants of habitability in residential leases, offering a pretrial rent 
collection mechanism as a quid pro quo.189 This is especially true of courts that 
recognized the covenants without statutory support190 and therefore are subject 
to landlords’ criticism for exceeding their institutional roles.191 Some courts 
seemed to believe LPOs were necessary to protect landlords’ due process 
rights.192 These courts were particularly inclined to point to a perceived change 
in the once summary nature of eviction proceedings,193 and to suggest that 
landlords deserve assured collection of any rent owed194 as compensation for 
delays.195  
The courts establishing LPOs appear to have little understanding of how 
these orders impact low-income tenants. While courts devote pages of meticu-
lous legal reasoning to support their recognition of the implied covenants,196 
they impose LPO requirements, often virtually without explanation, in a 
paragraph197 or a footnote,198 generally as dictum.199 Some tenants’ advocates 
 
litigation focuses on appeal bonds rather than LPOs. Comment, Landlord Protective Orders – A 
Lack of Guidelines for Appellate Use, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 132 (1971).   
189. See Smith v. Wright, 416 N.E.2d 655, 662 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979). 
190. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1076–77, 1083 n.67 (D.C. 
Cir. 1970); Hinson v. Delis, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (Ct. App. 1972); King v. Moorehead, 495 
S.W.2d 65, 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 900, 907 (Pa. 1979) 
(favoring, but not requiring, an escrow procedure); see also Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 
474, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (suggesting that LPOs may be required to correct for the side effects of 
“judicial innovation”). 
191. See, e.g., Pugh, 405 A.2d at 903–05. 
192. See, e.g., Martins Ferry Jaycee Hous., Inc. v. Pawlaczyk, 448 N.E.2d 512, 514 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1982); Rush v. S. Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 173 S.E.2d 744, 746 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970). 
193. See, e.g., Bell, 430 F.2d at 481–82.   
194. See id. at 479 & n.10; Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168 (Cal. 1974); Dameron 
v. Capitol House Assocs. Ltd., 431 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1981). 
195. Bell, 430 F.2d at 481; KNG Corp. v. Kim, 110 P.3d 397 (Haw. 2005); Stanger v. 
Ridgway, 404 A.2d 56 (N.J. Cumberland County Ct. 1979). But see Pernell v. Southall Realty, 
416 U.S. 363, 371–76 (1974) (finding ancient roots for the right to trial by jury in landlord-tenant 
cases). The delay argument assumes that tenants are primarily responsible for delays in the 
proceedings and hence subject to deterrence, that LPOs provide effective deterrence, that shifting 
the costs of delay through LPOs will not induce landlords to stall, and that the costs of the averted 
delays outweigh the burdens LPOs impose. See Cunningham v. Phoenix Mgmt., Inc., 540 A.2d 
1099 (D.C. 1988) (upholding dismissal of tenant’s pleadings and payment of escrow to landlord 
without trial when tenant missed a payment after a year of receiving no relief on her complaints of 
code violations). 
196. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072–83 (D.C. Cir. 1970); 
Hinson v. Delis, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 662–67 (Ct. App. 1972); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 
67–77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Pugh, 405 A.2d at 900–10. 
197. See, e.g., Hinson, 102 Cal Rptr. at 666; King, 495 S.W.2d at 77; Pugh, 405 A.2d at 
907. 
198. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1083 n.67. 
199. See, e.g., id. at 1083 n.67; Hinson, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 666; King, 495 S.W.2d at 77; 
Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1978). Indeed, the landlord in King did not respond to 
the tenant’s appeal in the Missouri Court of Appeals. King, 495 S.W.2d at 67. 
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shared this lack of understanding, themselves suggesting LPOs.200 Some courts 
and commentators cannot resist moralizing at tenants invoking the new 
defenses, calling LPOs necessary to demonstrate their “good faith.”201   
Rationales offered for LPOs expose fissures between the various purposes 
of the underlying reforms. For example, those focused on the instrumental goal 
of housing improvement view LPOs as creating a pool of money for repairs.202 
This suggestion—that rent excused under the implied warranty should repair 
the landlord’s building—certainly clashes with the redistributive goal, and low-
income tenants may face pressing humanitarian needs for which that money 
could prove vital. And requiring the buyer to pay the purchase price to a 
breaching seller to correct the latter’s noncompliance is hardly standard in 
contract law. At most the “repairs pool” argument might justify post-judgment 
escrowing of that portion of the rent not abated under the implied warranty.203 
The argument most striking in its resistance to the new regime, however, was 
that LPOs were needed to reduce the number of tenants asserting the new 
habitability defense.204 
b. Characteristics of LPOs 
In general, LPOs are imposed on tenants when they raise defenses based 
upon the warranty of habitability or retaliatory eviction205 or when they demand 
jury trials.206 Some jurisdictions limit LPOs to “action[s] for possession based 
upon nonpayment of the rent” and “action[s] for rent when the tenant is in 
possession,”207 but others allow LPOs even when the landlord has not put rent  
 
 
 
200. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 67 n.13 (1972); Javins, 428 F.2d at 1083 
n.67; LaPrade v. Liebler, 614 A.2d 546 (D.C. 1992); Jackson v. Rivera, 318 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Civ. Ct. 
1971); Spector, supra note 105, at 207.   
201. Dameron v. Capitol House Assocs. Ltd., 431 A.2d 580, 584 (D.C. 1981); L.V.G. 
Realty Corp. v. Maltez, 561 N.Y.S.2d 630, 631 (City Ct. 1990); see Emily Jane Goodman, 
Housing Court: The New York Tenant Experience, 17 URB. L. ANN. 57, 59 (1979). 
202. See, e.g., Scroggins v. Solchaga, 552 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); King, 
495 S.W.2d at 79; City of Mount Vernon v. Brooks, 469 N.Y.S.2d 517, 519 (City Ct. 1983); 176 
East 123rd Street Corp. v. Flores, 317 N.Y.S.2d 150, 155 (Civ. Ct. 1970); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. 
Velez, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406, 412 (Civ. Ct. 1973); see also Pugh, 405 A.2d at 907 (exhibiting 
confusion as to which party’s interests LPOs serve). 
203. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.190(a)(3) (2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 239, 
§ 8A (West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:13-d(II) (LexisNexis 2006). 
204. Stanger v. Ridgway, 404 A.2d 56 (N.J. Cumberland County Ct. 1979). 
205. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2) (2009); HENNEPIN COUNTY (MINN.) HOUS. CT. R. 
608 (2000), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/ruledocs/general/GRtitleVII.htm#g608; 
URLTA § 4.105(a); Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
206. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2)(a)(iii); Bell, 430 F.2d at 483. 
207. URLTA § 4.105(a); see Lindsey v. Prillman, 921 A.2d 782 (D.C. 2007); Bell, 430 
F.2d at 483. 
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at issue.208 Some jurisdictions also restrict LPOs to delays clearly caused by 
tenants.209 
Although many jurisdictions require LPOs in all cases210 or allow them on 
the judge’s own motion,211 others require the landlord to take the initiative by 
filing a motion and showing “a clear need for protection” or something 
similar.212 LPOs are equitable in nature,213 so landlords theoretically should 
establish the usual prerequisites for obtaining equity, including irreparable 
harm, inadequacy of their remedies at law, likely success on the merits,214 and 
clean hands. Equity principles would require landlords to prove that they have 
complied with health and safety laws to receive the “extraordinary”215 
protection of an LPO, but there is little evidence that this happens in practice.  
LPOs may require tenants to pay all current rent as it accrues,216 although 
some may require less,217 such as the “reasonable rent for the premises.”218 
They may also require tenants to deposit all of the back rent in dispute219 or the 
undisputed portion of the back rent.220 LPOs generally require tenants to make 
payments into a registry at the court,221 but others compel tenants to pay 
 
208. MICH. CT. R. 4.201(J)(1); Cunningham v. Phoenix Mgmt., Inc., 540 A.2d 1099 (D.C. 
1988). 
209. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-26b (West  2006) allows LPOs when the tenant delays 
filing her or his answer. 
210. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.60(2) (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-75 (2010); 
HENNEPIN COUNTY (MINN.) HOUS. CT. R. 608 (2000), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/ 
ruledocs/general/GRtitleVII.htm#g608; N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302-a.3.c. (McKinney 2001); 
King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). But see Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 
318 N.Y.S.2d 11, 20–21 (Civ. Ct. 1971). 
211. URLTA § 4.105(a). 
212. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-26b (West 2006); MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2); McNeal 
v. Habib, 346 A.2d 508, 512 (D.C. 1975) (giving tenant right to be heard but no right to present 
evidence); Bell, 430 F.2d at 483–84; Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1978). 
213. Bell, 430 F.2d at 479. 
214. Id. at 484. 
215. Id. at 481–82. 
216. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.60(2) (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 47-7-75 (a), (b) 
(2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-78(a) (LexisNexis 2006); Lipshutz v. Shantha, 240 S.E.2d 
738 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (refusing to reduce amount of LPOs by amount tenants spend on repairs). 
217. See, e.g., URLTA § 4.105(a); Bell, 430 F.2d at 483. 
218. MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2)(a) (2009). 
219. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.60(2) (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 47-7-75(a) (2010) 
(mandatory deposit of all back rent “allegedly owed” for which the tenant cannot show a receipt); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-421(1) (2009) (allowing the court to require tenants to pay “all or part 
of the rent accrued” into court); URLTA § 4.105(a); Fritz v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d 339, 343 
(Minn. 1973); see also Swartwood v. Rouleau, No. C8-98-1691, 1999 WL 293898 (Minn. Ct. 
App. May 11, 1999) (requiring tender of all back rent allegedly due). 
220. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1365(A) (West 2007). 
221. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.60(2) (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 47-7-75 
(2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-78 (LexisNexis 2006); MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2)(1)(a)(i) 
(2010); URLTA § 4.105(a); Bell, 430 F.2d at 479; Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 907 (Pa. 1979); 
King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). 
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landlords directly222 or require the court to disburse the tenant’s payments to 
the landlord223 before a trial on the merits—or even after the tenant has 
prevailed.224 LPO requirements may only come into effect if the action has not 
been tried after a certain waiting period,225 and they may be limited to a 
specific duration.226 
The failure of many jurisdictions to specify the penalty or response for a 
tenant’s failure to make payments required under an LPO, and a procedure for 
imposing that penalty or response,227 suggests that many judges and legislators 
are so far removed from the condition of low-income tenants that they cannot 
imagine noncompliance.228 Although LPOs’ delay-preventing rationale would 
make an accelerated trial on the merits a logical response to nonpayment of 
escrow,229 a number of jurisdictions refuse to allow tenants to raise their defen-
ses,230 deny tenants jury trials,231 or issue “default judgments” for landlords.232 
 
222. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118A.490(1) (LexisNexis 2010); Dameron v. 
Capitol House Assocs. Ltd., 431 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1981); City of Mt. Vernon v. Brooks, 469 
N.Y.S.2d 517 (City Ct. 1983). 
223. Cunningham v. Phoenix Mgmt., Inc. 540 A.2d 1099 (D.C. 1988); McNeal v. Habib, 
346 A.2d 508, 512 (D.C. 1975); Juliano v. Strong, 448 A.2d 1379 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); see, e.g., 
MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2)(b) (requiring court to “consider the defendant’s defenses” but not 
specifying whether this consideration must take the form of the trial); Fritz, 213 N.W.2d at 343; 
King, 495 S.W.2d at 77; cf. Washington v. H.G. Smithy Co., 769 A.2d 134, 139 (D.C. 2001) 
(allowing all collected rents to go to landlord if tenant did not raise habitability early in 
proceedings). But see URLTA § 4.105(a) (allowing the court to “determine the amount due to 
each party” but not specifying that this determination must be after a full trial on the merits); 
Hinson v. Delis, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (Ct. App. 1972); Bell, 430 F.2d at 485; Leejon Realty Co. 
v. Davis, 416 N.Y.S.2d 948 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (denying disbursement to landlord who had failed to 
make repairs). 
224. Temple v. Thomas D. Walsh, Inc., 485 A.2d 192 (D.C. 1984). 
225. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2)(a), 4.201(J)(1) (LPOs may be entered only for 
delays of more than seven days); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.341(a) (West 2002) (LPOs may be 
entered for adjournments of more than six days); Liam Hooksett, LLC v. Boynton, 956 A.2d 304 
(N.H. 2008) (allowing LPOs only when trial adjourned to allow for repairs); Edmond v. Waters, 
374 A.2d 483 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (finding LPO inappropriate where trial imminent). 
226. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.341(b) (West 2002) (limiting adjournments and 
LPOs to three months); cf. ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.190(a) (Michie 2010) (six-month limit on 
tenants’ post-trial deposits where landlords have been found to have failed to maintain the 
premises); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:13-d(II) (LexisNexis 2006) (one month limit on tenants’ 
post-trial deposits). 
227. See, e.g., URLTA § 4.105(a); Bell, 430 F.2d 474; King, 495 S.W.2d 65. 
228. But see Lovejoy v. Intervest Corp., 794 So. 2d 1205 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (upholding 
“the principle that an excessive bond may not be used to deny a meritorious appeal to a person of 
modest means”). 
229. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-26b(d) (West 2006); see also Rome v. Walker, 
196 N.W.2d 850, 854 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972). 
230. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.60(2) (West 2004); Swartwood v. Rouleau, No. C8-
98-1691, 1999 WL 293898 (Minn. Ct. App. May 11, 1999) (affirming refusal to allow tenant to 
offer defenses without tendering all back rent allegedly due); Conway v. Nissley, No. 68536, 1995 
WL 723298 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (affirming dismissal of counterclaims of tenant in arrearage on 
rent); Smith v. Wright, 416 N.E.2d 655, 661 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979) (denying tenants the right to 
raise the condition of the premises where they have not complied with an LPO); Jaroush v. Cook, 
296 S.E.2d 544 (W. Va. 1982) (requiring consideration of defenses of tenant missing LPO 
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c. LPOs’ Effect 
Data on the issuance of, and compliance with, LPOs is largely lacking.233 
As discussed in the next Section, however, very few low-income tenants appear 
to receive relief based on the implied warranty of habitability and related 
doctrines (such as constructive eviction and retaliatory eviction). Because they 
sharply reduce the expected value of pursuing those defenses, LPOs likely are a 
significant contributor to the low rate of relief granted to low-income tenants. 
When Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court made the right to a trial by jury 
conditional on compliance with LPOs, a year-long study found that not one of 
the more than 20,000 tenants appearing unrepresented received a jury trial.234 
Furthermore, both the burden of LPO payments and the risk of suffering 
the penalties for noncompliance are considerably greater for the poorest tenants 
and for those with the most serious repair problems. Conversely, LPOs provide 
the greatest benefit to the least responsible landlords: those who fail to maintain 
their units—and thus who would be most likely to lose in a trial on the merits—
and those willing to act ruthlessly to drive an assertive tenant from her or his 
dwelling. LPOs therefore directly undermine the repair-forcing, redistributive, 
and humanitarian goals of the tenants’ rights revolution.   
The impact of LPOs varies dramatically depending on the wealth of the 
tenant. For well-to-do tenants, complying with an LPO may be a bother and an 
expense. For the lowest-income tenants, however, making escrow payments 
may sometimes be impossible and may often require foregoing other 
necessities.235 Where the tenant actually owes the demanded funds but faces a 
 
payments). 
231. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2)(a)(iii) (2009); Harris v. Hous. Auth. of Balt. City, 
549 A.2d 770 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (requiring a hearing for tenant missing LPO payments). 
This might also be the response of jurisdictions that impose LPOs in response to tenants’ jury 
demands. See Bell, 430 F.2d at 483. 
232. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 47-7-75(c) (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-78(b) 
(LexisNexis 2006); Davis v. Rental Assocs., Inc., 456 A.2d 820 (D.C. 1983) (approving default 
judgment despite tenant’s tender of full amount of arrears prior to trial); Mahdi v. Poretsky 
Mgmt., Inc., 433 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 1981) (approving judgment for landlord as sanction for tenant’s 
nonpayment of LPO). But see K.D. Lewis Enters. Corp., Inc. v. Smith, 445 So. 2d 1032, 1035 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (granting landlord possession but allowing tenant to litigate 
counterclaims); Rotheimer v. Arana, 892 N.E.2d 1183 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (rejecting judgments of 
possession as sanctions for nonpayment of LPOs). 
233. Cf. RICHARD T. LEGATES & ALAN GREENWOOD, AN ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
AND JUDICIAL COSTS OF PRE-TRIAL RENT DEPOSITS IN CALIFORNIA i (1992) (estimating large 
administrative costs to expand LPOs). 
234. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 25, 36, 47. In 20,228 cases, the tenant had no 
attorney. See id. at 26, 36. 
235. Hous. Auth. of Balt., 549 A.2d 770 (rejecting hardship defense of unemployed tenant); 
see CHILDREN’S SENTINEL NUTRITION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (C-SNAP), FUEL FOR OUR 
FUTURE: IMPACTS OF ENERGY INSECURITY ON CHILDREN’S HEALTH, NUTRITION, AND 
LEARNING 3 (2007), available at http://www.childrenshealthwatch.org/upload/resource/ 
fuel_for_our_future_9_18_07.pdf (describing hardships low-income families face when they have 
insufficient funds for both food and shelter costs). 
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terrible dilemma, she or he may seek relief only under equity courts’ traditional 
mandate of mercy for the poor.236 But if the landlord has failed to maintain the 
premises, the implied warranty of habitability vitiates some or all of the 
tenant’s rental obligation, and she or he should not be faulted for diverting 
those funds to meet other needs. In addition, public assistance programs pay 
some tenants’ rent directly to the landlord; these tenants may be unable to 
redirect those payments to the court in time to prevent a default on the LPO.237   
Unethical landlords may induce tenants to default on escrow payments. 
Landlords are more likely to be repeat players with greater familiarity with 
court procedures;238 they may be able to mislead or confuse their tenants about 
the latter’s escrow obligations. In a jurisdiction providing for an automatic 
forfeiture of the tenant’s rights upon a default in escrow payments, the landlord 
may be able to induce a default with a hint of forbearance. Where the escrow 
order was oral or written in “legalese,” a pro se tenant may default after relying 
on inaccurate information from the landlord. The landlord may persuade the 
court to issue an escrow order for more than the contract rent amount.239 
Similarly, landlords in jurisdictions requiring payment of back rent in dispute 
may demand money already received. Poor tenants particularly are susceptible 
to these tactics, both because they cannot afford to make double payments and 
because their market position prevents them from insisting upon more formal 
accounting procedures.   
The burden of LPOs may be compounded if the low-income tenant’s 
dwelling has severe defects. The tenant may have to spend her or his rent 
money to mitigate the damages a defect in the premises has caused.240 For 
example, a tenant without adequate heat may spend the rent money on space 
heaters. As such, malicious landlords can force tenants to divert their rent 
money by cutting off essential utilities or creating some other intolerable 
condition once an LPO issues.   
Finally, tenants may have their own reasons for not complying with an 
LPO. Tenants with strong defenses who would welcome decisions on the 
merits may fail to make required escrow payments because they doubt the 
courts will grant them redress. A tenant whose dwelling has deteriorated to the 
 
236. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 88–89, 104 (2d ed. 
1979). 
237. Cf. Shipman v. Carr, 449 A.2d 187 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1982) (rejecting habitability 
defense where Section 8 payments on behalf of tenant terminated due to landlord’s failure to 
repair). A sophisticated tenant could explain this to the court; many low-income tenants, however, 
may not know when or how to explain this or may be embarrassed by their public assistance 
status. 
238. Alan J. Pollock & George A. Kokus, Comment, Model Residential Landlord-Tenant 
Code—Proposed Procedural Reforms, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317, 321–22 (1971). 
239. Lovejoy v. Intervest Corp., 794 So. 2d 1205 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001); Amanuensis, Ltd. 
v. Brown, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11, 21 (Civ. Ct. 1971). 
240. See Lipshutz v. Shantha, 240 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (refusing to reduce 
amount of LPO by amount tenants spent on repairs). 
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point that it is worth far less than the payment the LPO requires may see 
compliance as throwing good money after bad. Moving may seem a more 
reasonable alternative, at least avoiding payment of back rent to the non-
repairing landlord. By encouraging tenants to move rather than to pursue claims 
against non-repairing landlords, LPOs frustrate the instrumental, redistributive, 
and humanitarian purposes of the tenants’ rights reforms (although they may 
occasionally further contract principles by prompting efficient breaches). 
B. Empirical Evidence of the New Regime’s Impact in Court 
A wide variety of courts, using a wide variety of procedures, handle 
eviction cases. Studies of the new landlord-tenant regime’s implementation 
further vary in methodology and in quality. Their conclusions, however, are 
strikingly consistent. Each step required to raise and favorably resolve claims 
relating to disrepair has proven problematic. 
First, the new substantive regime did not appear to increase the number of 
eviction cases filed.241 This suggests that few tenants are withholding rent 
deliberately to bring the issue of repairs to court. 
Second, the judicial resources applied to the average case are quite 
modest.242 Nine-minute trials243 take the concept of a “rocket docket” to an 
entirely different level, and the number of jury trials has remained extremely 
small.244   
Third, a huge fraction of eviction cases never reach open court.245 
Landlord-tenant courts have extremely high default rates.246 Courts depend on 
 
241. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 22, report that the number of possession actions 
filed in Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court remained almost the same in 1969, the first full year in 
which the reforms were in force. The number rose somewhat the next year, but then began moving 
back towards its pre-tenants’-rights level.  
242. In 1985, each New York City Housing Court judge handled 8,688 evictions. Ken 
Karas, Recognizing a Right to Counsel for Indigent Tenants in Eviction Proceedings in New York, 
24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 527, 537 n.86 (1991). Detroit Landlord-Tenant Court judges 
annually disposed of more than 10,000 cases each in the 1970s. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, 
at 21. 
243. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 1001–03, found the average contested case is nine 
minutes. Fusco et al., supra note 130, at 105 & n.60 (1979), reported that in Chicago “[t]he 
average court-allotted time for each contested case was approximately two minutes,” including the 
approximately twenty seconds “necessary to call the case and for the parties to approach the 
bench.”  
244. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 49, report that only nine jury trials were held in 
Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court in twelve months of 1970 and 1971. Over a fifteen-year period, 
less than 0.05 percent of Ohio evictions were tried to a jury. See Frank G. Avellone, The 
Maddening Status of the “Habitability Defense” in Ohio Eviction Law: Revisiting Where We 
Must, 23 URB. LAW. 355, 359 n.31 (1991).  
245. Some 96 percent of Maryland eviction cases are uncontested, making the appearance 
of crowded dockets illusory. Williams v. Hous. Auth. of Balt., 760 A.2d 697 (Md. 2000). 
246. Some 53 percent of the eviction actions filed in Springfield, Massachusetts in 1978 
resulted in defaults being entered. Jerrold B. Winer, Pro Se Aspects of Hampden County Housing 
Court: Helping People Help Themselves, 17 URB. L. ANN. 71, 79 (1979). Mosier & Soble, supra 
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default judgments to control their dockets and design procedures to obtain them 
whenever possible,247 typically requiring no motion or affidavit—which pro se 
landlords might not know how to produce—before entering a default 
judgment.248 In addition, court personnel and landlords’ lawyers induce most 
tenants to concede in formal or informal settlements.249 Once the landlords 
receive all that they sought—either rent or possession—they voluntarily 
dismiss their cases.250 This suggests that many tenants are indeed choosing to 
move rather than litigate. A number of judges encourage those tenants who do 
reach court to make the same choice.251 
Fourth, of the minority of cases that reach court, the overwhelming 
majority are resolved with no reference to the condition of the premises.252 
Some tenants may have their defenses foreclosed by failure to give the landlord 
notice or to pay escrow under an LPO. For a great many, however, this is the 
result of an overwhelming mismatch in knowledge and litigation capacity. 
Many tenants lack the sophistication to assert the warranty in a written 
pleading253 or the presence of mind and assertiveness to do so orally in the 
momentary window of opportunity presented in open court.254 Because of very 
 
note 125, at 26, reported that in 1970–1971, 59.2 percent of the nonpayment actions and 51.4 
percent of other eviction actions resulted in default judgments against the tenant. Rose & Scott, 
supra note 85, at 994, recorded a default rate of 49.4 percent in nonpayment actions and 45.2 
percent in other eviction cases. About 80 percent of Washington, D.C., tenants default. 
Cunningham, supra note 121, at 107, 134. 
247. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 988 n.88. 
248. Compare Cunningham, supra note 121, at 111, with FED. R. CIV. PROC. 55(b) (2010) 
(requiring an affidavit or motion). 
249. Cunningham, supra note 121, at 117; 144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d 
956 (Civ. Ct. 1992) (describing tenants’ propensity to sign settlements out of fear even where they 
have meritorious defenses). 
250. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 26, found 23.5 percent of nonpayment defendants, 
and 17.0 percent of other eviction defendants, capitulated before their cases reached court. Rose & 
Scott, supra note 85, at 994, similarly found 24.6 percent of nonpayment defendants and 11.2 
percent of other tenant-defendants gave up before their court dates.  
251. Judges repeatedly interrupted tenants’ testimony about defects in the premises with 
coercive suggestions that the tenants move: “If it’s so bad, why don’t you move?,” “Of course you 
want to move,” “Maybe he’s doing you a favor,” etc. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 1009–10; 
Fusco et al., supra note 130, at 105 n.61; Garrett v. Cross, 935 So. 2d 845, 847 (La. Ct. App. 
2006) (affirming trial judge who responded to tenant’s complaints about repairs by telling tenant 
that was “one reason, probably, why you want to move out”).   
252. See Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson, 396 N.E.2d 981, 985 (Mass. 1979) (noting that 
tenants raise the new defenses in only a tiny fraction of cases, making the cost for landlords 
slight). 
253. E.g., Vanlandingham v. Ivanow, 615 N.E.2d 1361 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Sandefur 
Mgmt. Co. v. Smith, 486 N.E.2d 1234 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985). A clerk reported, “it is almost 
impossible to educate tenants that an answer should be filed prior to the hearing.” Winer, supra 
note 246, at 78. Perhaps because of “an inability to express one’s feelings in writing, . . . the vast 
majority of tenants simply appear in court to give their side of the story without any prior notice.” 
Id.    
254. Bezdek, supra note 87, at 566–97. 
Super.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/26/2011  10:58 PM 
436 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  99:389 
limited legal services funding,255 tenants are seldom represented by counsel,256 
and without the help of lawyers may not have a clear understanding of their 
new rights or of court procedures.257 Landlords, on the other hand, are far more 
likely to be represented258 and frequently leverage their superior legal 
knowledge to confuse and mislead unrepresented tenants.259 Even when 
landlords are not represented, courts typically require less specificity than the 
usual level of notice pleading.260 Legal stationery stores, and even courts, 
provide landlords with form complaints that prompt them for all allegations 
required to make out their cases.261 No comparable resources are typically 
available to pro se tenants unsure about their defenses.262 Judges and clerks 
commonly assist landlords in making their cases and refuting their tenants’ 
cases.263 Thus landlords, in sharp contrast to tenants, actually fare better in 
court unrepresented.264 
 
255. Karas, supra note 242, at 535–36; Lynn E. Cunningham, The Legal Needs of the Low-
Income Population of Washington, DC, 5 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 21, 58–61 (2000).  
256. Brakel, supra note 83, at 581, reports that legal aid attorneys represent only 9 percent 
of tenants in contested eviction cases. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 36, report tenants being 
represented in Detroit Landlord-Tenant Court in only 7 percent of contested cases. Fusco et al., 
supra note 130, at 105 n.63, report that only 7.1 percent of the tenants appearing in contested 
cases were represented. With only one in five cases contested, Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 
29, this means that only 1 to 2 percent of tenants facing eviction have counsel. Only 12 percent of 
New York City tenants in contested cases had lawyers in the 1990s. Carroll Seron et al., The 
Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: 
Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 L. & SOC’Y REV. 419, 421 (2001). 
257. When Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court briefly replaced traditional legalese notices 
and summonses with “plain English” forms briefly mentioning the defenses of retaliation and 
failure to repair, tenants raised defenses at up to twice the prior rate. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, 
at 997–99.  
258. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 36, report that landlords were represented in 48.6 
percent of the “contested cases.” Fusco et al., supra note 130, at 105 n.62, found 73.8 percent of 
Chicago landlords represented. Ninety-eight percent of New York City landlords had counsel. 
Seron et al., supra note 256, at 421. 
259. The Center for National Housing Law Reform’s 1978 study of landlord-tenant cases 
in eleven Michigan cities found that in 90 percent of the cases resolved out-of-court, tenants 
received terms as bad as or worse than the harshest judgments the court could have issued (on file 
with author). 
260. Cunningham, supra note 121, at 127–29. 
261. Id. at 119. 
262. A court committee in Detroit designed, but did not widely distribute, a form answer. 
Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 986–91, 1024. The Connecticut Housing Court made similar 
efforts to be open to pro se litigants. Eldergill, supra note 118, at 299–300.   
263. Fusco et al., supra note 130, at 108–25; see Espinoza v. Calva, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 
496 (Ct. App. 2008) (reversing trial court for so limiting tenants’ time to present evidence as to “in 
effect, preclude[] them from presenting their defense”); R & O Mgmt. Corp. v. Ahmad, 819 
N.Y.S.2d 382 (App. Term. 2006) (reversing dismissal of tenant’s counterclaims, which the 
landlord-tenant court had entered because the landlord was unprepared); Koch v. Mac Queen, 746 
N.Y.S.2d 229 (App. Term. 2002) (reversing trial judge that rejected habitability defense after 
refusing to subpoena building inspector and refusing to admit photographs of the premises); 
Prince Hall Village Apts. v. Braddy, 538 P.2d 603 (Okla. Civ. App. 1975) (finding bias in trial 
judge’s questioning of tenant about receipt of welfare).     
264. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 35–37 (citing results from Detroit and Brooklyn); 
Super.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/26/2011  10:58 PM 
2011] THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY 437 
The adjudicatory model that emerges is a curious hybrid of the common 
law adversarial system and an almost administrative inquisitorial system. 
Landlords—these courts’ traditional constituents—benefit from a particularly 
lenient version of notice pleading, approaching an inquisitorial approach. 
Tenants, on the other hand, must articulate an explicit legal defense in a way 
more reminiscent of antiquated common law pleading265—or even the old 
English practice of “waging one’s law.”266 
Fifth, studies indicate that landlords have won an overwhelming 
proportion of the nonpayment actions filed. Even where rental housing 
conditions were bad267 and getting worse,268 landlords were winning total 
victories in upwards of 97 percent of all nonpayment cases started.269 And with 
 
Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 1001–02. 
265. See Brown v. Robyn Realty Co., 367 A.2d 183 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976) (dismissing 
tenant’s habitability argument for failure to plead terms of lease properly); Garrett v. Cross, 935 
So. 2d 845 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (finding tenant’s complaint about landlord’s failure to repair 
insufficient to assert habitability defense); Jablonski v. Casey, 835 N.E.2d 615 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2005) (affirming dismissal of habitability defense despite housing code violations, including leaks, 
cracked walls and floors, and ant infestation, for tenant’s failure to show clear harm); Flynn v. 
Riemer, 1991 Mass. App. Div. 50 (Dist. Ct. 1991) (finding no breach of warranty when tenant was 
without water for four weeks but did not prove that landlord acted willfully); Payne v. Rivera, 904 
N.Y.S.2d 878 (Civ. Ct. 2010) (severing tenant’s counterclaim for failure to repair); 601 West 
Realty LLC. v. Chapa, No. 59446/03, 2003 WL 22087614 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. July 28, 2003) 
(dismissing tenant’s counterclaim because tenant “failed to establish the impact of” lead paint and 
other housing code violations); Cater v. Saunders, No. SP 5881/01, 2002 WL 31207219 (N.Y. 
Dist. Ct. Sept. 30, 2002) (same); L & M Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 605 P.2d 1347 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) 
(finding housing code violations insufficient to establish lack of habitability); cf. Dickhut v. 
Norton, 173 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1970) (imposing strict requirements on tenants alleging retaliatory 
eviction). 
266. Compurgation, or wager of law, required certain litigants to recite long, complicated 
oaths asserting the merit of their position. Any slips of the tongue and the matter would be decided 
against them. BAKER, supra note 236, at 5–6. 
267. At the same time Cleveland’s landlord-tenant court was rarely invoking the warranty, 
64,000 of the 133,000 rental units in Cleveland were “substandard.” David M. McIntyre, URLTA 
in Operation: The Ohio Experience, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 587, 595. The estimated rat 
population of the City of Detroit in 1974 was 750,000. DETROIT NEWS, July 1, 1974, at 2B. 
268. The Detroit Department of Health reported in 1972 that there were 5,185 fewer well-
maintained residential structures in the city that year than there were in 1968, the year Michigan’s 
legislature passed the tenants’ rights reforms. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 64, n.92. 
Approximately 30 percent of Detroit’s housing was “deteriorating” or “dilapidated” in 1972. Id. 
269. Gerchick, supra note 139, at 790. Mosier & Soble report that Detroit tenants in 1970–
1971 won total victories in only 0.1 percent of the nonpayment of rent cases started. Mosier & 
Soble, supra note 125, at 33. Tenants won partial rent abatements in another 2 percent of the 
cases. Id. Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 1009 fig.17, report that landlords were winning 
favorable outcomes in 97.5 percent of the nonpayment cases started in 1974. Fusco et al., supra 
note 130, at 104, report that Chicago landlords in 1976 won everything they sought in at least 84.6 
percent of the “contested cases” heard. This figure is virtually identical to the “contested case” 
statistics that Mosier & Soble report. Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 33. (A “contested case” 
is one in which both the landlord and the tenant appear. Mosier & Soble reported that only 20.1 
percent of the Detroit cases were “contested.” Id. at 26. If the Chicago court had a similar rate of 
defaults and voluntary dismissals by landlords before cases came to court, it too would have an 
approximately 97 percent victory rate for landlords.) And some of the winners were more 
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the lack of counsel and lack of sophistication among pro se tenants contributing 
significantly to these results—and with the poorest tenants typically living in 
the worst housing—the largest disparity between objective housing conditions 
and results in court is likely among those whom the reforms most sought to aid.  
Sixth, even in those rare cases where courts did award tenants relief for 
defective housing, the amounts of those awards were far too small to 
incentivize landlords to make repairs or to encourage other tenants to raise 
defenses.270  
Seventh, although objective data is unavailable on the number of tenants 
with valid retaliation defenses, judgment for a tenant on this basis is extremely 
rare.271 A landlord contemplating a retaliatory eviction is unlikely to be 
deterred by a prohibition so seldom enforced.272 Although no empirical 
evidence allows comparison of the number of landlords resorting to self-help 
before and after the reforms, their success rate in court gives them little reason 
to resort to self-help. 
Beyond these outcome measures is a consistent picture of courts ill-
equipped or disinclined to carry out the transformative role the tenants’ rights 
revolution envisioned for them.273 Michigan’s Supreme Court lamented: 
 
sophisticated middle-class tenants, hardly those whose conditions prompted the reforms. See 
McIntyre, supra note 267, at 596. 
270. See, e.g., C.F. Seabrook Co. v. Beck, 417 A.2d 89 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) 
(denying rent abatements for months other than those for which landlord’s action sought rent); 
303 Beverly Grp., L.L.C. v. Alster, 735 N.Y.S.2d 908 (App. Term 2001) (disallowing 
consequential damages); Landmarks Restoration Corp. v. Gwardyak, 485 N.Y.S.2d 917 (City Ct. 
1985) (abating rent 20 percent but offsetting that with an exceptional award of attorneys’ fees to 
the landlord); Tower West Assocs. v. Derevnuk, 450 N.Y.S.2d 947 (Civ. Ct. 1982) (granting 10 
percent rent abatement); Surratt v. Newton, 393 S.E.2d 554 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (disallowing 
damages exceeding the amount of rent paid). But see Brown v. LeClair, 482 N.E.2d 870 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1985) (affirming award of statutory damages for willful failure to repair); Pleasant East 
Assocs. v. Cabrera, 480 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Civ. Ct. 1984) (awarding punitive damages where failure 
to repair is racially motivated). 
271. According to Mosier & Soble, supra note 125, at 34–35, Detroit tenants in 1970–1971 
won only 0.4 percent of all simple termination cases started. Some of these cases may have 
involved other defenses, such as an assertion that the notice to terminate tenancy was improper in 
form or service. So the actual number of cases in which tenants prevailed on the retaliation 
defense could be even smaller. (The Chicago figures reported, supra note 269, were for all 
“contested cases,” including both nonpayment and other termination actions.) 
272. Moreover, because the only penalty for attempted retaliation is refusal to allow that 
eviction, even strict enforcement of the prohibition would have little deterrent value. See Bldg. 
Monitoring Sys., Inc. v. Paxton, 905 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1995) (allowing retaliatory evictions once 
premises repaired and tenant given time to find other housing). 
273. Fusco et al., supra note 130, at 108–25. Judges ruled against tenants even when the 
tenants were the only competent testimony on an issue, id. at 112, even when they supported a 
defense of payment with receipts, id. at 113, and even when they proved the existence of serious 
repair problems with unrebutted photographic evidence, id. at 111 n.91. Judges relied upon the 
incompetent hearsay of landlords’ lawyers who admitted having had no direct contact with the 
premises. Id. at 125. Judges asked landlords’ lawyers to check tenants’ allegations with their 
clients by telephone and then entered judgment against the tenants on the basis of the landlords’ 
un-cross-examined “telephone testimony.” Id. “[D]ead attorneys and landlords have secured 
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The atmosphere of the Detroit Landlord-Tenant Court . . . does not 
encourage deliberate, reasoned and compassionate justice, although it 
deals with one of the basic material essentials of life, a roof over one’s 
head. Judges, litigants and court personnel are harassed and depressed. 
In many cases both the landlords and tenants are barely making it 
financially, and oftentimes they are not making it at all. Cases involve 
housing conditions that are not the most desirable. Consequently, 
relations are often strained and not infrequently beyond the breaking 
point. Many of the tenants do not understand their rights at all, 
although some understand them too well. Sometimes landlords are in 
the same posture. It would be difficult to handle these cases with 
justice under the best of circumstances. But circumstances are far 
from the best. The case load is incredible. The court facilities are just 
a little better than tolerable. Matters that can be avoided are 
avoided.274 
As noted above, tenants’ propensity to raise the landlord’s failure to 
repair, and hence the implied warranty’s deterrent effect, depends heavily on 
tenants’ prospects of success in court, both initially and against any subsequent 
retaliation. This particularly is true for tenants contemplating deliberate rent 
withholding. With substantive rules barring involuntary defendants and courts’ 
tepid implementation deterring more financially stable tenants, the implied 
warranty’s effect is limited to a small group of outliers. The next Part asks 
whether means were available to do better.   
III. 
WERE THE NEW REGIME’S FAILURES INEVITABLE? 
The result of the supposed tenants’ rights revolution falls far short of 
achieving any of its three instrumental goals of improving the condition of 
rental housing, redistribution of income, and averting humanitarian crises.275 
Different substantive and procedural rules might have made the tenants’ rights 
revolution more effective. On the other hand, changes that have taken place in 
the housing market over the past several decades might have limited the impact 
of even a more sensitively designed regime of landlord-tenant law. In the same 
way, the demise of high-paying, low-skill, industrial jobs and changing 
 
favorable judgment when represented by persons unauthorized to practice law.” Id. at 118. Rose & 
Scott, supra note 85, at 1009–12, describe similar practices in Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court. 
274. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Wingate, 273 N.W.2d 456, 460–61 (Mich. 1979). 
275. Moreover, as discussed above, supra notes 267–72 and accompanying text, even the 
new regime’s intramural goal of legal modernization faltered. The covenants of landlord and 
tenant are not truly mutual if the tenant’s breach renders the landlord’s irrelevant, but the converse 
is not true. As such, the reform failed to modernize this area of law. Landlord-tenant law remains 
an idiosyncratic world unto itself if landlords can obtain an effectively equitable remedy without 
showing prerequisites for equitable relief, including clean hands and the lack of an adequate 
remedy at law—and without themselves being subject to equitable orders compelling their 
compliance with the covenant of repair during an action’s pendency. 
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attitudes toward social provision following the collapse of communism would 
have limited the success of even a more robust regime of welfare rights.  
The state of rental housing may have changed during this period,276 but 
the implied warranty appears to have affected far too few cases to be a likely 
cause.277 For the same reason, it seems unlikely that the implied warranty has 
done much to improve the quality of life of the low-income tenants whose 
plight it claimed to address. 
Although the substantive and procedural obstacles to the implied 
warranty’s implementation are superficially separate, they are linked. The 
doctrines that limit who can raise the implied warranty impose a form of 
rationing of judicial resources, which seemed necessary to the courts because 
those resources did not increase with the new need to find facts concerning 
housing conditions. The number of tenants deliberately invoking the warranty 
is small enough that the courts could adjudicate their cases more or less within 
existing resource constraints.   
This Part analyzes the tenants’ rights revolution’s failure on several levels. 
Section A shows that the explicit legal rules that have prevented widespread 
invocation of the implied warranty were not inevitable corollaries of the new 
tenants’ rights. Section B considers whether the tenants’ rights revolution might 
have benefited from an infusion of procedural ideas from the contemporary 
welfare rights revolution. Section C explores broader changes in the housing 
market to which the tenants’ rights revolution has failed to respond. Finally, 
Section D sums up the new regime’s impact, highlighting the similarity 
between its failings and those of the welfare rights revolution identified in the 
Introduction. 
A. Substantive Failures: Unjustified Limitations on the Implied Warranty 
Identifying the sources and underlying rationales of the policies that have 
curtailed the implied warranty of habitability is difficult for two reasons. Some 
reasons for the warranty’s failure, such as the complexity of trial courts’ 
operating procedures and attitudes of trial judges and clerks, are difficult to 
document and genuinely may not result from any organized, conscious decision 
making. Others, including notice requirements and LPOs, are obvious and 
deliberate but have impacts that are hard to trace in the empirical literature. All 
of these barriers operate as a system, even if they were not designed as such. 
Subsection 1 critiques the requirement that tenants withhold rent deliberately if 
 
276. See infra Part III.C.  
277. The overwhelming empirical evidence of the warranty’s non-enforcement in court 
would seem to require econometricians claiming to find evidence of its effects to explain a 
mechanism by which that result might be achieved. E.g., Werner Z. Hirsch, From “Food For 
Thought” to “Empirical Evidence” About Consequences of Landlord-Tenant Laws, 69 CORNELL 
L. REV. 604, 609 (1984); Werner Z. Hirsch, Habitability Laws and the Welfare of Indigent 
Tenants, 63 REV. ECON. & STAT. 263 (1981). 
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they wish to raise the implied warranty of habitability. Subsection 2 questions 
the wisdom and legality of LPOs. In both instances, ambivalence about the 
implications of the tenants’ rights revolution, or about low-income tenants, 
proved far more important than broader legal and policy principles. Had they 
tried, courts and advocates would have found compelling reasons to reject the 
requirements of deliberate withholding and of LPOs. 
1. The Requirement of Deliberate Rent Withholding 
The doctrines confining the implied warranty’s availability to tenants 
deliberately provoking nonpayment actions, and excluding those raising the 
warranty only defensively, in part represent a moral judgment. The precise 
basis of that judgment is unclear: surely a struggling business that fell behind 
on its payments to a vendor could argue that the vendor’s goods were defective 
without opprobrium. Middle-class judges and lawyers, however, pay for their 
purchases on time as a matter of pride, and by failing to do so without a 
deliberate, legally sanctioned plan, low-income tenants place themselves 
outside of the middle-class value system. Courts and even tenants’ own lawyers 
describe the requirement that tenants have the funds to pay the contract rent as 
demonstrating “good faith.” Yet lacking funds is not an indication of 
dishonesty,278 but rather means the tenant may be incapable of present 
performance. That should not necessarily excuse the landlord’s performance. 
“It is customary to pay rent in advance”279 for each month. The landlord 
must perform her or his covenants during the upcoming month to earn the 
prepaid rent. If the premises fall into disrepair during the ensuing month, the 
landlord has not earned the rent already paid and is in breach.280 The standard 
rule in contract is that a non-breaching party need not continue to perform once 
the other has committed a material breach281—in the present context, a breach 
that gives the tenant “substantially less or different” from what the warranty of 
habitability requires.282 Not all breaches of the covenant to repair are material, 
but many are. Thus, if the landlord’s implied covenant to repair is truly mutual 
with the tenant’s express covenant to pay rent, the tenant’s obligation to pay 
 
278. “Poverty and immorality are not synonymous.” Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 
177 (1941). 
279. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 65 (1972). 
280. When rent is prepaid and the tenant stops paying rent after the premises have fallen 
into disrepair, the landlord will have failed to render performance for which the tenant has already 
paid. The tenant’s tender of the next month’s rent is therefore not a condition to the landlord’s 
performance of her or his covenants for that month since the landlord has yet to earn all of the rent 
that she or he has already received.   
281. For example, “[I]t is a condition of each party’s remaining duties to render 
performance to be exchanged under an exchange of promises that there be no uncured material 
failure by the other party to render any such performance due at an earlier time.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1981).   
282. 23 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:3 (4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter 
WILLISTON]. 
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rent ceases when material defects appear in the premises.283 Once the landlord 
materially breaches the implied warranty of habitability, the tenant’s ability or 
inclination to pay rent becomes irrelevant because that “performance is 
excused”284 until the landlord comes into compliance, at which point damages 
for the landlord’s breach are ascertained. 
Alternatively, if the landlord’s failure to repair is not material and the 
tenant has stopped paying rent, contract law would treat both parties as being in 
breach and award appropriate damages against each.285 Where the tenant’s duty 
to pay rent depends on the landlord’s performing the covenant to repair and the 
landlord fails to do so, the landlord is entitled to damages, not the contract 
rent.286 Under this view, both landlord and tenant must answer for their 
respective breaches where the tenant has stopped paying rent on a defective 
dwelling. Requiring the tenant to perform, or demonstrate capacity to perform, 
her or his covenant in order for the landlord to be liable for her or his breaches 
is inconsistent with true mutuality of obligations. 
Similarly, whether the tenant knows her or his legal rights at the time she 
or he stops paying rent would be irrelevant under general contract law. Breach 
is defined by the nonperforming party’s conduct,287 not the contemporaneous 
state of mind of the party alleging the breach.288 The general rule in contract is 
that “notice or demand is unnecessary where the obligation to perform is 
absolute and unconditional.”289 Exceptions apply when the obligated party has 
no way to know when its performance is necessary or when the contract 
explicitly requires notice.290 Although some defects may be within the sole 
knowledge of the tenant, many are not. Some are present when the tenant takes 
possession.291 Landlords can observe most others when they inspect their 
properties to ensure that tenants are not causing damage. The Uniform 
Commercial Code’s (UCC) rule requiring notice of breach of warranty for 
defective goods292 provides a dubious analogy because there the vendor has no 
continuing access to the goods; in any event, most courts hold it inapplicable 
where the vendor is aware of the breach, as landlords often will be.293 
 
 
283. Conversely, of course, once the tenant stopped paying rent, a landlord who was then 
in compliance with the covenant to repair may regard the tenant as being in breach. 
284. 23 WILLISTON, supra note 282, § 63:3. 
285. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 946 (one vol. ed. 1952); 23 
WILLISTON, supra note 282, § 63:3. 
286. 23 WILLISTON, supra note 282, § 63:2. 
287. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235(2) (1981). 
288. 23 WILLISTON, supra note 282, § 63:1. 
289. 17A AM. JUR. 2d CONTRACTS § 594 (2004). 
290. Id. 
291. Limiting the implied warranty to latent defects, see Rabin, supra note 23, at 580, thus 
would strengthen notice requirements and make the warranty still harder to enforce.   
292. U.C.C. § 2-607 (2009). 
293. 18 WILLISTON, supra note 282, § 52:42 (4th ed. 2001). 
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Of course, because the warranty of habitability is a term read into the 
landlord-tenant contract by courts, the courts could insert a notice requirement 
as well.294 Doing so, however, would be unwise, particularly in light of the 
lower courts’ difficulty in enforcing the new landlord-tenant regime. Giving 
notice exposes the tenant to the risks of retaliation. Tenants currently unaware 
of the warranty of habitability and of the legal protection against retaliatory 
eviction are exceedingly unlikely to risk giving notice to a landlord they 
suspect does not wish to repair the premises further. For the tenant that is fami-
liar with her or his rights, the decision whether to give notice is similar to, but 
not identical with, that discussed in the preceding Part about whether to invoke 
the warranty of habitability affirmatively: the tenant has no immediate prospect 
of monetary reward for taking action, but she or he also does not face any 
immediate litigation costs and may hope that merely notifying the landlord of a 
defect may not be as likely to provoke retaliation as withholding rent or filing 
suit. As discussed above, however, making the implied warranty available only 
to tenants making a deliberate decision to punish the landlord’s failure to repair 
is likely to limit the effectiveness of that warranty considerably. 
2. Landlords’ Protective Orders 
The justifications offered for LPOs correspond closely to those for 
insisting that rent withholding be deliberate. Even more directly than the 
requirements of deliberate withholding, LPOs have become a means of docket 
control, helping to bridge the gap between the new regime’s generous 
substantive pronouncements and its parsimonious allocation of adjudicatory 
resources. LPOs are likely to cause some cases to settle and others to drop from 
dockets when tenants miss escrow payments due to financial emergencies or 
fatigue from living in the poorly repaired dwelling. This docket-control 
orientation likely explains why rules limiting LPOs to unusual circumstances 
quickly gave way to near-universal issuance.   
Because they so explicitly limit the mutuality of the covenants of landlord 
and tenant and so directly subordinate the instrumental goals of the new 
substantive regime, LPOs provide a useful basis for assessing whether the 
apparent revolution in landlord-tenant law represents a fundamental change or a 
modest, nearly cosmetic, update. Subsection 2.a considers and dismisses the 
major rationales offered for LPOs. Subsection 2.b suggests that contemporary 
constitutional law provided courts several bases on which they could have 
declined to impose, or struck down, LPO requirements.  
a. Deficiencies in the Justifications Offered for LPOs 
The weak justifications for LPOs suggest that LPOs are not necessary to 
the implementation of the warranty of habitability. Arguments that LPOs are 
 
294. Most legislative implied warranties of habitability have no such term.  
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required to avoid depriving landlords of property without due process of the 
law cannot bear serious scrutiny. First, the supposed deprivation of property 
suffered by a landlord during the course of the litigation of a possession dispute 
is no different from that suffered by any plaintiff with a meritorious claim. 
Second, whether the accruing rent is in fact the landlord’s property is unclear 
until trial of the tenant’s defenses. Third, even assuming the validity of the 
landlord’s claim, routine litigation delays probably do not constitute a 
deprivation of due process.295 The U.S. Supreme Court seems unlikely to apply 
Mathews v. Eldridge296 or similar due process tests to constitutionalize the 
scheduling of civil litigation, least of all in “summary proceedings” already 
expedited more than most civil cases.297 Indeed, landlords have no more right 
to compensation for the new defenses’ elongation of possessory actions than 
tenants had when summary proceedings replaced slow-moving common law 
ejectment.  
LPOs, therefore, represent policy choices rather than constitutional 
obligations. The policy arguments for LPOs298 reflect the normative confusion 
underlying the tenants’ rights revolution. For example, several of the arguments 
for LPOs reveal deep diffidence about equalizing the position of landlord and 
tenant. Arguments that LPOs protect landlords from harm while the litigation is 
pending apply equally well to tenants living in defective housing, yet only the 
tenant’s covenant, and not the landlord’s, receives extraordinary pretrial 
enforcement. Similarly, while LPOs protect landlords from the possibility of 
unenforceable judgments,299 no comparable measure assures tenants that 
landlords will make repairs the court finds necessary or pay any judgments on 
the tenants’ counterclaims.   
LPOs also preserve the exceptionalism of landlord-tenant law that the new 
regime sought to end: few other civil litigants must pay the moneys sought by 
their adversaries to assert their defenses—even when the amount in controversy 
is far higher than the value of most dwellings in summary proceedings cases.300 
 
295. Any rule allowing tenants to stay in their dwellings during the pendency of the 
litigation is “in no way responsible for” the tenants’ actions as it only “permits but does not 
compel” those private actions. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 165 (1978). 
296. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
297. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 536 (1972) (finding even the constitutional right 
to a speedy trial in a criminal case not violated where the record indicates “that the defendant did 
not want a speedy trial”).  
298. See supra Part II.A.2.a. 
299. Many states’ summary proceedings do not award money judgments against tenants 
but state rental arrears “only for the purpose of prescribing the amount which . . . shall be paid to 
preclude issuance of the writ of restitution.” MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5741 (West 2000); 
Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474, 485 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Schlesinger v. Brown, 282 
A.2d 790, 791 (N.J. Essex County Ct. 1971). Landlords in these states have no judgments to 
enforce. 
300. Bell, 430 F.2d at 479 (noting that “such a protective order represents a noticeable 
break with the ordinary processes of civil litigation”). 
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And as one court found, there is “no evidence which indicates that it is any 
more difficult to satisfy a judgment against a tenant than against any other 
debtor.”301   
Imposing LPOs to prevent delay in landlord-tenant proceedings similarly 
lacks justification. As the Supreme Court has noted,  
Some delay . . . is inherent in any fair-minded system of justice. A 
landlord-tenant dispute, like any other lawsuit, cannot be 
resolved with due process of law, unless both parties have had a fair 
opportunity to present their cases. Our courts were never intended to 
serve as rubber stamps for landlords seeking to evict their tenants, but 
rather to see that justice be done before a man is evicted from his 
home.302 
Eviction cases, unlike more complex civil cases, provide little opportunity to 
stall with abusive discovery. To treat the warranty defense as a culpable delay 
betrays an ambivalence about the new regime that courts and legislatures can 
address substantively if they are so inclined. The main cause of delay in many 
courts is a deficient allocation of resources to adjudicate eviction cases,303 
reflecting a sense that they are less important than the rest of the courts’ 
dockets.304 Prompt scheduling, not LPOs, is the obvious remedy.305   
LPOs likewise fail to serve the instrumental goal of improving urban 
housing conditions. The achievement of this goal requires courts to accept large 
numbers of cases, at least initially. Yet some courts openly acknowledge using 
LPOs for docket control.306 LPOs also eliminate the incentives for tenants in 
ill-repaired dwellings to undertake the risk, expense, and effort required to 
assert the implied warranty by requiring them to create a “pool,” which the 
landlord has not earned, to finance repairs. This pool also reduces landlords’ 
incentives to maintain their units prior to litigation.   
As with the roughly contemporaneous imposition of costly work 
requirements that did little to enhance welfare recipients’ employability,307 the 
motivation for LPOs appears largely moralistic. Granting welfare rights only to 
those recipients proving their moral worth through participation in workfare 
obviated the need to confront stereotypes of the lazy poor;308 confining tenants’ 
rights to those tenants proving their sincerity with deposits in court similarly 
 
301. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1970). 
302. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 385 (1974). 
303. See David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) 
(discussing shortages of adjudicatory resources). 
304. Eldergill, supra note 118, at 297. 
305. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5735(2), (4) (West 2000) (establishing 
strict scheduling timelines); BOSTON HOUS. CT. R. 5 (2009). 
306. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2)(a)(iii) allows the court to preserve a non-paying 
tenant’s right to a jury trial “if, in the court’s discretion, the court’s schedule permits it.” 
307. KATZ, supra note 59, at 64–66.   
308. Super, New Moralizers, supra note 50, at 2045–46. 
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insulated judges and legislators from attacks based on the stereotypes of the 
irresponsible, manipulative poor. In each case, however, the failure to 
understand the challenges low-income families confront led to numerous false 
negatives—industrious welfare recipients unable to navigate workfare 
bureaucracies and honest tenants unable to comply with LPOs—and prevented 
the underlying substantive reforms from reaching more than a tiny fraction of 
their target populations. As the Court noted in Lindsey v. Normet, monetary 
barriers to access to the court system not only bar meritorious arguments by 
those unable to make payments, but also allow frivolous claims “by others who 
can afford” the required amounts.309 Little evidence suggests that tenants are 
more prone to raise meritless defenses than landlords are to make abusive 
claims310 or, indeed, than litigants in other kinds of cases are to abuse the 
process. 
b. Constitutional Questions About LPOs 
In keeping with the sharp line the Court insisted it was drawing between 
substance and process,311 Lindsey v. Normet declined to constitutionalize the 
implied warranty of habitability.312 LPOs, however, are procedural. At the same 
time the implied warranty of habitability was sweeping the country, several 
newly evolving due process doctrines seemed to cast grave doubt on the 
constitutionality of LPOs. Curiously, however, few reported decisions consider 
such challenges. This may reflect the paucity of low-income tenants’ litigation 
resources, as well as the difficulty low-income tenants face staying in disputed 
units long enough for their cases to reach appellate courts. At a minimum, these 
doctrines suggest that LPOs were far from inevitable. The prevalence of LPOs 
therefore seems attributable to courts’ deeper ambivalence about the tenants’ 
rights revolution. 
At least three evolving doctrines might have rendered LPOs 
unconstitutional. First, just as courts were adopting LPOs, the Court was 
striking down other similar payment requirements: filing fees for divorces,313 
double appeal bonds for tenants appealing eviction decisions,314 prohibitions on 
remarriages for absent parents behind on their child support payments,315 and 
paternity actions in which putative fathers were denied blood tests for which 
they could not pay.316 When the Court upheld filing fees for bankruptcy317 and 
 
309. 405 U.S. 76, 78 (1972). 
310. Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11, 21 (Civ. Ct. 1971). 
311. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 563, 564 (1972) (differentiating between an 
employee’s substantive and procedural due process rights). 
312. 405 U.S. at 64. 
313. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971). 
314. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 74. 
315. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382 (1978). 
316. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); see also Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 409 
(1887) (rejecting monetary barriers to court access). 
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for appeals of welfare fair hearing decisions,318 it distinguished the prior cases 
as involving a state monopoly on the means to resolve those petitioners’ claims. 
The same logic would seem to distinguish LPOs, because defendants by 
definition face a judicial monopoly on resolution of the claims brought against 
them.319 The Court also seemed to think that some of the access fees it upheld 
were de minimus burdens that would not deter determined litigants;320 monthly 
rental payments are not de minimus.321 
A second line of cases during this period invalidated coerced prejudgment 
deprivations of property,322 a category that might be expected to include LPOs. 
In these cases, the Court required a prior judicial determination of probable 
cause to support the seizure of an opposing claimant’s property323 and, even 
then, permitted deprivations only for the briefest of periods necessary to 
arrange and hold a hearing to adjudicate the claims to possession of the 
disputed property.324 The Court also required the party seeking a seizure to post 
a bond against wrongful deprivations of property.325 Coerced deprivations, such 
as LPOs, are treated identically with physical seizures.326 Whether or not the 
rent is turned over to the landlord, the property is “impounded and, absent a 
bond, put totally beyond [the defendant’s] use during the pendency of the 
litigation” and hence seized.327 Beyond this, the court must balance the parties’ 
interests in determining whether any prejudgment seizure is justified.328 At a 
 
317. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 443–44, 450 (1973). 
318. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 656, 658–61 (1973) (per curiam); see also Bankers 
Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 85 (1988) (upholding 15 percent penalty on 
unsuccessful appeals of money judgments). 
319. In Little, Lindsey, and Hovey, litigants successfully challenging access barriers had 
been brought into court involuntarily as defendants. Little, 452 U.S. at 3; Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 59–
62; Hovey, 167 U.S. at 409–10. Kras and Ortwein rejected challenges from parties seeking to 
initiate judicial proceedings. Kras, 409 U.S. at 437; Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 656–57. To be sure, 
fortuitous circumstances can determine whether a litigant is a plaintiff or a defendant. Frank I. 
Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One’s Rights—
Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1154–58. Once someone is haled into court as a defendant, however, 
she or he must depend on the court to vindicate her or his rights in the litigation.  
320. See Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 660 (describing the fee as providing “some small revenue”); 
Kras, 409 U.S. at 449. 
321. They most resemble the child support payments in Zablocki, where the appellee was 
ordered to pay $109 per month. 434 U.S. at 378. 
322. N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601, 605–08 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 
407 U.S. 67, 96–97 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969). This was 
one of the grounds on which Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11, 15, 21 (Civ. Ct. 1971), 
struck down New York’s LPO statute.  
323. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. at 606–07. Indeed, Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 24 (1991), 
decided two decades after LPOs came into broad use, holds that prejudgment seizures may be 
unconstitutional even after a showing of probable cause.   
324. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 15. 
325. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 606–07 (1974).   
326. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 20 n.26 (1978).  
327. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. at 606. 
328. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 606–10. Crucial in Mitchell were that the proceedings there had 
Super.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/26/2011  10:58 PM 
448 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  99:389 
minimum, these cases would seem to compel courts to hold a trial of the 
possession dispute within about ten days.329 They also would invalidate 
automatic requirements for escrow payments without specific judicial 
findings.330 And yet these arguments rarely appear in LPO cases. 
A third doctrine the Court explored in this period involved the 
longstanding principle that “[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is 
the opportunity to be heard,”331 allowing the defendant to “choose for himself 
whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.”332 By 1976, the Court had 
crystallized much of its due process analysis into the Mathews v. Eldridge333 
balancing test—a test that LPOs would be unlikely to pass. Mathews requires 
the court to weigh three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected”; 
(2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.”334 Taking these factors in turn, 
first, tenants’ property interests, as the Court has acknowledged,335 are 
substantial; the common law also recognized a tenant’s leasehold as property 
long before the advent of the “new property.”336 Second, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation when a trial is denied to a tenant failing to make required payments 
is roughly equal to the fraction of tenants with good defenses.337 The probable 
value of doing away with the sanctions for LPOs is the sum of the individual 
values of each of the “procedural safeguards” that would then become available 
at a trial. The procedural detriment also is high where failure to make required 
payments results in loss of the right to a jury.338 Finally, as for the 
 
a “low risk of a wrongful determination of possession,” id. at 610, the issues were amenable to 
simple documentary proof, id. at 609–10, and the stakes were relatively modest for those subject 
to seizure, id. at 610. None of these factors militates in favor of LPOs. 
329. Id. at 607.  
330. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. at 606. Nor may the court issue an LPO upon only conclusory 
allegations in a complaint or application, or upon more specific information based upon hearsay. 
Id. at 607. 
331. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). 
332. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
333. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
334. Id. at 335. Although Mathews was an administrative law case, the Court applied its 
criteria to private civil litigation. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 6 (1981). But see Dusenbery v. 
United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167–68 (2002) (narrowing Mathew’s applicability long after LPOs 
had become well established).  
335. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 385 (1974); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 
444, 452 (1982); see also Thorpe v. Hous. Auth., 386 U.S. 670 (1967) (recognizing that tenants’ 
security of tenure was an important goal of federal housing legislation). 
336. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 34, § 1.2. 
337. Greene, 456 U.S. at 453, rejected hypothetical evaluation of defaulted parties’ cases as 
an insufficient answer to those parties not fitting the stereotypes on which the evaluation—or 
speculation—is based.   
338. See Pernell, 416 U.S. at 384–85 (suggesting that a jury trial may be essential to 
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governmental interests, the state shares the tenant’s interest in an accurate 
adjudication.339 This is particularly true where those adjudications seek to serve 
the broader social aims of the implied warranty of habitability. The state has 
interests in the well-being of both its landlords and its tenants, but those 
interests seem more apt to support substantive rules than procedures shifting 
burdens among litigants.340 To be sure, eliminating LPOs would increase the 
number of cases state courts would have to decide on the merits, increasing 
costs. Still, the state legislatures and courts adopting the implied warranty 
surely were aware that doing so would increase litigation costs and concluded 
that bearing those costs was in the state’s interests.341 Overall, each of the 
Mathews factors suggests that LPOs should be eliminated because they deprive 
tenants of due process. 
Tenants’ lawyers could have invoked each of these three doctrines to 
invalidate LPOs. Even where lawyers did not raise these doctrines, however, 
courts could and should have considered them in declining to announce LPO 
requirements. This was particularly true in the many instances in which the 
posture of the cases before them did not present LPOs for decision. Because 
these courts were already reaching beyond questions presented to them, they 
should have been careful to identify possible constitutional concerns.342 
Although these and other theories343 would have been contested, they 
 
obtaining justice for tenants). According to Rose & Scott, supra note 85, at 1003, tenants’ chances 
of winning at least partial victories improved from one in seventeen to one in three when the 
hearing was extended from less than five minutes to eleven minutes or more.   
339. Cf. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981) (finding a similar state 
interest in a case involving the termination of parental rights); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13–14 
(1981) (finding a similar state interest in a case involving paternity). 
340. The same sort of state interests in protecting classes of litigants received only the 
scantiest discussion in Di-Chem, Fuentes, and Sniadach. Under Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 
U.S. 149, 158, 165 (1978), and Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 65, 71 (1972), the state could revert to 
allowing landlords to repossess property through self-help. And Lindsey effectively allows it to 
reduce the number and complexity of defenses available to tenants. 405 U.S. at 86 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting in part). But the state’s broad freedom to set substantive law does not imply authority to 
achieve similar ends procedurally. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 
(1985). 
341. In due process analysis, the state is generally not considered to have a legitimate 
interest in avoiding decisions on the merits of claims it has chosen to authorize. Logan v. 
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). 
342. In other words, the courts were already disregarding prudential principles that counsel 
against considering arguments not raised by the parties when they issued dicta about the 
procedures in future eviction cases. 
343. Separate majorities in Logan found due process and equal protection violations in a 
state law that created rights but denied the opportunity to those whose complaints a state agency 
did not process rapidly. The right to a trial could have served as the fundamental right to trigger 
elevated scrutiny under the equal protection model announced in San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1973). The entrenchment of LPOs in the new regime of 
landlord-tenant law also coincided with the growth of state constitutional law as an independent 
source of civil liberties. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). 
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nonetheless suggest that courts had ample means to question the legitimacy of 
LPOs, had they been so inclined. 
B. Procedural Failures: Lessons from the Welfare Rights Revolution 
The procedural concerns central to the welfare rights revolution received 
grossly insufficient attention in the tenants’ rights revolution. A few 
jurisdictions recognized that procedural change was necessary to implement the 
tenants’ rights revolution’s substantive changes.344 Unfortunately, these 
jurisdictions relied on a self-transformation by the least-funded, lowest-status 
courts in the judiciary, courts with well-developed sets of commitments largely 
inconsistent with the new regime’s needs. This naïve reliance sprang from an 
overestimation of the importance of the line between courts and administrative 
agencies. Just as procedural due process and legitimacy concerns have 
compelled administrative tribunals to take on many of the characteristics of 
courts, managerial considerations have caused low-level courts to become more 
like administrative agencies. 
Although landlord-tenant courts emphatically adhere to a judicial form, 
they have much in common with administrative tribunals. Like administrative 
agencies, they must efficiently handle large numbers of cases with modest 
resources. Also like administrative tribunals, they occupy an extremely low 
place in the legal system’s social and structural hierarchy, and their decisions 
often are subject to review by courts with little or no other appellate 
jurisdiction.345 Thus, lessons from the welfare rights revolution’s administrative 
tribunals may apply to the courts hearing landlord-tenant cases.   
The adversarial system implicitly assumes that parties are rational actors 
with lawyers and substantial, evenly matched resources to devote to 
litigation.346 None of these assumptions are reliably met in eviction cases, 
where tenants frequently lack representation and possess inferior resources. 
Even as low-status courts were holding tenants rigidly to the adversarial 
requirement that they develop the facts of repair problems, elite courts—whose 
litigants were far better suited to the adversarial system—were increasingly 
adopting continental ideas giving judges more responsibility for factual 
development.347   
 
344. See Eldergill, supra note 118, at 297–99. 
345. Compare, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.605 (West 2008) (establishing circuit 
courts as courts of general jurisdiction), and 42 PA. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 931 (West 2004) (same 
for common pleas courts), with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5753 (West. 2008) (allowing 
appeals of evictions to circuit courts), and 68 PA. STAT. § 250.513 (2004) (same for common 
pleas courts). 
346. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
494, 511–15 (1986).  
347. Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and 
the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1247 (2005) (arguing 
that this shift was not entirely new but was rather a revival of older traditions); John H. Langbein, 
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Welfare recipients’ inability to initiate actions prevented Goldberg v. 
Kelly’s administrative hearing system from transforming public welfare law, 
but those hearing officers did far better at reaching individualized, merits-based 
adjudications despite inferior resources and far more complex substantive 
law.348 Whether by transferring eviction cases to actual administrative tribunals 
or relying on magistrates, special masters, or other parajudicial officers whose 
lower cost and specialization allow them to devote the time required to inquire 
into the condition of the premises, easing the resource constraints and either 
abandoning or destabilizing courthouse culture could have resulted in much 
broader application of the implied warranty. This sort of transformation occur-
red a decade or so later in another area of law with a strong adversarial 
history—child support. Some states maintain highly judicialized child support 
systems, but many have responded to federal incentives to transfer most juris-
diction to administrative tribunals.349 Whether or not the cases stayed in court, 
states adopted guidelines substantially narrowing adjudicatory discretion.350   
C. The Dynamics of Housing Problems 
The most fundamental challenge for the tenants’ rights movement, one 
even harder to remedy than inconsistent substantive rules or unresponsive 
courts, springs from its inability to adapt to social and economic change. In 
particular, the movement was rooted in a conception of bad housing that 
seemed to make sense in the peculiar conditions of the late 1960s and early 
1970s but that has long since become obsolete. Just as the welfare rights 
movement’s response to the problems of arbitrary eligibility workers and 
malicious states proved wholly ineffectual when the national consensus in favor 
of subsistence benefit programs collapsed, the tenants’ rights movement was 
ill-equipped to respond to housing problems not involving vermin and falling 
plaster. This Section shows how three other forms of bad housing became 
increasingly important after the implied warranty of habitability arose. These 
kinds of bad housing proved far less susceptible to a regulatory response. The 
effects of tenants’ poverty are likely to be hydraulic: unless tenants’ incomes 
improve, efforts to reduce the incidence of one kind of bad housing are likely to 
increase the incidence of the others. 
1. Types of Bad Housing 
Housing is one of the most socially and economically complex 
commodities individuals purchase. Housing arrangements can adversely affect 
residents in at least four different ways. First, and most obviously, housing can 
 
The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825, 858–66 (1985).  
348. Super, Efficient Rights, supra note 5, at 1086–89. 
349. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(c) (2006). 
350. See id. §§ 666(a)(10), 667(a).  
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include unhealthy or unsafe conditions. Second, it can be remote from 
important services its occupants need. Third, it can provide too little room for 
the number of people occupying it. And fourth, it can consume so much of the 
residents’ income that they face deprivation of other necessities. All four types 
of housing problems often have severe deleterious consequences.  
Unhealthy or unsafe conditions in decaying housing can cause profound 
harm. Chipping and peeling paint at home is the dominant cause of childhood 
lead poisoning, which can profoundly and permanently stunt children’s 
intellectual and emotional development.351 Asthma is the leading cause of 
urban school absences, and roach, rodent, and mold infestation are leading 
causes of asthma.352  
Another adverse effect of housing can be its relative isolation. Living in 
inexpensive areas increases the difficulty and cost of obtaining employment 
and child care. One study found that for every dollar low- and moderate-
income working families save on housing they spend seventy-seven cents more 
on transportation: those in relatively inexpensive housing had to pay more than 
three times as much for transportation.353 Indeed, some 44 percent of moderate-
income working families devote more than half of their incomes to shelter and 
transportation.354 Inexpensive areas also often have bad schools,355 crime, 
violence, and a dearth of opportunities356 that can have long-term impacts on 
children’s lives. Access to jobs has become increasingly important as public 
benefit programs have ceased to aid the long-term unemployed and increased 
the administrative burdens of retaining assistance.357 
Overcrowded housing also has a significant negative impact on children’s 
educational attainment358 and health.359 Children in crowded housing are more 
likely to suffer delayed cognitive development, to have trouble reading, and to 
act out in school.360 Crowding into smaller spaces is only a partially successful 
strategy: overcrowded families remain at higher risk for food shortages.361 
 
351. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THIRD NATIONAL REPORT ON HUMAN 
EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS 38–42 (2005). 
352. Patrick L. Kinney et al., On the Front Lines: An Environmental Asthma Intervention 
in New York City, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 24, 24–25 (2002). 
353. Id. at 16–18, 25. 
354. Id. at 20. 
355. Id. at 14.  
356. See SHARON VANDIVERE ET AL., FUNDERS’ NETWORK FOR SMART GROWTH & 
LIVABLE COMMUNITIES, HOW HOUSING AFFECTS CHILD WELL-BEING (2006). 
357. See Super, Invisible Hand, supra note 55, at 832–36. 
358. Dalton Conley, A Room with a View or a Room of One’s Own? Housing and Social 
Stratification, 16 SOC. FORUM 263 (2001). 
359. BARBARA J. LIPMAN, CTR. FOR HOUS. POL’Y, SOMETHING’S GOTTA GIVE: WORKING 
FAMILIES AND THE COST OF HOUSING 35 (2005). 
360. Gary W. Evans et al., Chronic Residential Crowding and Children’s Well-Being: An 
Ecological Perspective, 69 CHILD DEV. 1514, 1514–15 (1998). 
361. LIPMAN, supra note 359, at 35. 
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Finally, high housing costs negatively impact residents’ ability to afford 
other essentials. Moderate-income working tenants spending more than half 
their incomes on housing spend significantly less on food and clothing, and 
barely a quarter as much on health care, as those whose housing costs 
consumed no more than 30 percent of their funds.362 As a result, they are 
significantly more likely to run out of food before the end of the month and to 
lack health insurance than similar families in more affordable housing.363 
Children in food-insecure households such as these are 30 percent more likely 
to be hospitalized and 90 percent more likely to be in fair or poor health 
compared to their peers; they also are more likely to have mental illnesses and 
problems in school.364 High housing costs are a significant cause of the high 
rate of personal indebtedness among low- and moderate-income families.365 
Stating which of these four defects is the most harmful is impossible a 
priori. For example, although numerous physical defects may endanger 
residents’ physical health, overcrowding can endanger their mental health, 
isolation from healthcare facilities can cause treatable conditions to worsen, 
and high rents can render tenants unable to afford medication. Thus low-
income tenants could quite reasonably choose badly maintained housing over a 
better but more expensive dwelling. Despite conventional wisdom that public 
housing is low quality, children in public housing projects are significantly 
more likely to advance in school than other children in tenant households.366 
Policy-makers should be loath to assume that their value judgments about the 
best housing for a family are superior to the family’s own decisions. 
2. The Changing Mix of Bad Housing 
When courts and legislatures began to recognize the implied warranty of 
habitability, housing codes routinely imposed maximum occupancy 
requirements and the relationship between housing value and location was well 
known.367 Indeed, overcrowding historically has been at least as prominent an 
image of slum housing as physical defects.368 And many of the same studies 
that mobilized concern about bad housing also detailed the broader effects of 
 
362. Id. at 16. 
363. Id. at 29. 
364. CHILDREN’S SENTINEL NUTRITION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (C-SNAP), THE SAFETY 
NET IN ACTION 3 (2004). 
365. LIPMAN, supra note 359, at 25. 
366. Janet Currie & Aaron Yelowitz, Are Public Housing Projects Good for Kids?, 75 J. 
PUB. ECON. 99, 101 (2000). 
367. See, e.g., WILLIAM ALONSO, LOCATION AND LAND USE: TOWARD A GENERAL 
THEORY OF LAND RENT 111–13 (1964) (describing housing values as complementary to 
commuting costs). 
368. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 9, 205–07 (1961). 
The two forms of bad housing often will be related: overcrowding results in more intensive wear 
and more physical defects. 
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poverty.369 
Conditions at the time, however, distracted policymakers, activists, and 
many scholars from forms of bad housing other than disrepair. A glut of 
housing resulting from explosive suburban growth and white flight370 yielded 
historically low rents.371 This, in turn, reduced the extent of overcrowding: a 
low-income family might move into a cramped unit, but it was less likely to 
have to double up with another low-income family.372 Optimism about the 
simultaneous welfare rights revolution likely also produced complacency about 
the availability of necessary funding.373 Finally, rapid suburbanization was 
turning on its head the traditional means of valuing location, in which property 
values declined the farther out from the center.374  
As the unusual conditions of the 1960s and 1970s subsided, however, the 
unsustainable housing glut disappeared and more typical housing market 
conditions returned.375 Once again, new rental housing construction 
disproportionately targets the top fifth of the rental market,376 doing little to 
ease pressures in the lower end of the market. Housing costs are rising faster 
than median incomes and much faster than incomes in the lower end of the 
distribution.377 As a result, although a great many low-income renters still live 
in decaying homes, other types of bad housing have come more to the fore. In 
addition, this country’s industrial decline and the rise of a bicoastal economy 
has led to much sharper regional differences in housing markets than were 
 
369. KERNER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 69, at 258–59, 457–82. One of the most 
influential antipoverty manifestos of the 1960s carefully addressed each of these forms of bad 
housing. MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA 3–5, 147–49, 153–54, 164–65 (1962). 
370. Deborah Kenn, Paradise Unfound: The American Dream of Housing Justice for All, 5 
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 69, 70 (2005).  
371. See George Sternlieb & James W. Hughes, Private Market Provision of Low-Income 
Housing: Historical Perspective and Future Prospects, 2 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 123, 129–30 
(1991) (describing a surplus of housing arising in the 1960s and increasing in the 1970s). 
372. If proponents considered crowding at all, it was as a means by which tenants could 
discipline landlords for raising rents. See Ackerman, supra note 86, at 1105. 
373. Failure to come to grips with income issues also may reflect the lack of overlap 
between people working on housing and income issues. The former were addressed in state courts 
and state legislatures’ judiciary committees; the latter appeared in administrative agencies, federal 
courts, Congress, and state legislatures’ appropriations processes. Influential legal services 
lawyers typically specialized in housing or welfare, not both. Two welfare-oriented activists’ 
study of social movements in the 1960s and early 1970s has no chapter on tenants’ unions. PIVEN 
& CLOWARD, supra note 70. 
374. Proponents of the warranty saw the undesirable locations of low-income tenants’ 
housing as undermining landlords’ market power. Kennedy, supra note 145, at 487–92. 
375. See Dowell Myers & John Pitkin, Demographic Forces and Turning Points in the 
American City, 1950–2040, 626 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 91, 94 (2009) (describing 
correction of low rents through large real increases from 1970 to 2000, outstripping income 
growth). 
376. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING: 2004, at 23 
(2004). “Middle market” building nationally, however, has been proportionate to its share of the 
rental market. Id. 
377. Id. at 20. 
Super.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/26/2011  10:58 PM 
2011] THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY 455 
appreciated at the outset of the tenants’ rights revolution. It may have seemed 
slightly odd a quarter-century ago for a high court in a rural state to invoke the 
problems of urban slums to recognize the implied warranty of habitability.378 
That incongruity pales next to that seen today between housing market 
dynamics in coastal boomtowns such as Seattle and Boston, on the one hand, 
and those in collapsing industrial cities in the nation’s interior, such as St. 
Louis and Detroit, on the other. 
Data from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 
(HUD) American Housing Survey over the past three decades show a huge 
decline in the availability of unsubsidized low-rent housing.379 These same data 
show a significant increase in overcrowding among low-income people, 
particularly in the prosperous metropolitan areas on the East and West Coasts 
where redevelopment has reestablished the desirability of central locations.380   
As a result, HUD has reported that about half of very-low-income renters 
not receiving public subsidies have “worst-case” housing problems.381 Almost 
60 percent of tenants with worst-case housing needs are children, elderly, or 
people with disabilities.382 Almost four in five very-low-income renters have 
moderate to severe housing problems—bad conditions, crowding, or housing 
consuming so much of the family’s budget that it tends to crowd out other 
necessities383—with most of the rest apparently receiving government 
subsidies.384   
Yet over the decades since the implied warranty became widely 
recognized, the nature of these worst-case problems has changed. The number 
of very-low-income tenants reported in severely inadequate conditions has 
dropped by about two-thirds, but the number with crushing rent burdens 
skyrocketed.385 Despite a broad consensus that housing should not consume 
more than one-third of a family’s budget, some 60 percent of households with 
incomes below 30 percent of their area’s median—households HUD classifies 
 
378. See, e.g., Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984). 
379. See, e.g., EDWARD B. LAZERE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, IN SHORT 
SUPPLY: THE GROWING AFFORDABLE HOUSING GAP (1995); PAUL A. LEONARD & EDWARD B. 
LAZERE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, A PLACE TO CALL HOME: THE LOW INCOME 
HOUSING CRISIS IN 44 MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS (1992). 
380. See MILLS, supra note 81, at 64 (expounding an economic model in which the cost of 
housing is inversely related to its distance from the center); Doug Timmer, Urban Revitalization? 
Bah, Humbug, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 1998, at 18 (discussing the varying recent development 
patterns of coastal and interior cities). 
381. OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., TRENDS 
IN WORST CASE NEEDS FOR HOUSING, 1978–1999, at 7 (2003) [hereinafter HUD TRENDS]. The 
U.S. Housing Act defines “very-low-income” as less than half of median income in the area, 
which includes the overwhelming majority of people below the poverty line and many of the near-
poor. Id. at 10. 
382. Id. at 3. 
383. Id. at 13. 
384. See id. at 27. 
385. Id. at 8. 
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as extremely low-income—pay over half of their incomes for rent.386 Thirteen 
million working families, including four million supported by a full-time 
worker, pay over half of their incomes for shelter.387   
The tenants’ rights movement did not successfully adapt to these changes 
in housing needs. The implied warranty is not a tool for preventing high rent 
burdens or overcrowding. Moreover, the substantive and procedural obstacles 
discussed above suggest that the warranty of habitability is unlikely to have 
played any significant role in reducing the incidence of housing defects. That 
reduction probably is the result of the lack of long-term economic viability of 
much of the low-cost housing market except in areas with extremely low land 
values. The current glut resulting from the burst housing bubble is depressing 
housing values in the short term, although likely not to the degree that white 
flight did in the post–World War II decades. The lesson of the past thirty years, 
however, is that this momentarily inexpensive housing will not last: some will 
be rehabilitated and reabsorbed into the middle-income market, and much of 
the rest will be abandoned and destroyed. Because much of the newly vacant 
housing is of less substantial construction than what the new suburbanites left 
behind in the central cities previously, the process of decay and abandonment 
may proceed more rapidly. 
Policies prioritizing elimination of physically defective housing over other 
kinds of housing problems have wide-ranging consequences for antipoverty 
policy. Eliminating physically defective housing may increase rents, thereby 
pushing more low-income households to live in remote areas, which in turn is 
likely to aggravate problems connecting them with employment and 
transportation. Transportation is one of the least subsidized major expenses for 
low-income families, and even public transportation policy commonly favors 
affluent suburbanites who must be lured out of their cars.388 Concentration of 
low-income people in undesirable urban locations also is likely to reduce 
employment opportunities,389 as well as the education available to low-income 
children and the fiscal stability of the municipalities with concentrated 
poverty.390 
 
386. DANILO PELLETIERE ET AL., NAT’L LOW-INCOME HOUS. COAL., WHO’S BEARING 
THE BURDEN? SEVERELY UNAFFORDABLE HOUSING 1 (2005). 
387. LIPMAN, supra note 359, at 10. This study defined a family as working if at least half 
of its income was earned and its annual income was less than 120 percent of the local area median 
income. Id. at 15. 
388. N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding such 
favoritism a rational exercise of transit system managers’ business judgment); Comm. for a Better 
N. Phila. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., Civ. A. No. 88-1275, 1990 WL 121177 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 
1990) (recognizing such disparities but not finding them actionable); Sean B. Seymore, Comment, 
Set the Captives Free!: Transit Inequity in Urban Centers, and the Laws and Policies Which 
Aggravate the Disparity, 16 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 57 (2005). 
389. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW 
URBAN POOR 149–82 (1996).  
390. James M. Buchanan, Principles of Urban Fiscal Strategy, 11 PUBLIC CHOICE 1, 13–
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In addition, the tenants’ rights movement has neglected the issue of 
overcrowding. Increasing the numbers of low-income families doubling up in 
housing can prevent public benefit programs’ eligibility tests from measuring 
need properly.391 Involuntary overcrowding also can twist power relationships 
within families, increasing the risk of abuse; such intra-familial abuse is a 
problem that antipoverty law finds particularly difficult to address.392   
Finally, the tenants’ rights movement has not adapted to what appears to 
be the current major housing problem: high rent burdens. Allowing housing 
costs to crowd out other necessities exacerbates the inequities between the large 
majority of low-income people receiving no major housing subsidies and the 
minority that do.393 It also increases the chances that families will feel 
compelled to trade some of the public benefits they receive to meet other needs 
for housing, thus undermining those programs’ integrity and support. 
Even if the implied warranty of habitability and housing code enforcement 
were effective against defective housing, the effects of low-income tenants’ 
poverty likely would have proven hydraulic, producing a different kind of bad 
housing. Indeed, this is true even if one posits that rent control prevented sharp 
cost increases as landlords were compelled to make repairs—a highly debatable 
assumption—and that housing code enforcement further prevented over-
crowding. Nevertheless, in economically healthy metropolitan areas this 
hydraulic effect might well have shrunken the supply of low-cost housing units 
to the point that low-income renters faced stiff competition even for units 
isolated from jobs and transit lines, with many at risk for homelessness.  
3. Consequences of Selective Enforcement of the Warranty 
As shown above, substantive and procedural limitations on the new 
landlord-tenant regime tend to limit the warranty of habitability’s applicability 
to more affluent tenants that deliberately initiate disputes with their landlords 
rather than poorer ones who might raise the warranty defensively. This has 
several perverse impacts, some apparent and others hidden. Most obviously, 
this frustrates the redistributive and humanitarian purposes of the reforms and 
leaves most serious housing problems unaddressed. Thus, the net effect of the 
new regime, if selectively enforced in this manner, may be negative rather than 
neutral. A major source of new, low-cost, unsubsidized housing has long been 
units that “filter-down” from higher-cost housing markets after years of 
 
16 (1971). 
391. See Robinson v. Block, 869 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that two siblings residing 
in the same house may not “live together” for purposes of rules requiring co-resident adult siblings 
to apply for food stamps together). 
392. ROB GEEN ET AL., URBAN INST., WELFARE REFORM’S EFFECT ON CHILD WELFARE 
CASELOADS 9–10, 34–37 (2001); ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN 118–21 (1999). 
393. See David A. Super, From the Greenhouse to the Poorhouse: Carbon-Emissions 
Control and the Rules of Legislative Joinder, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1170–71 (2010) 
(quantifying these inequities) [hereinafter Super, Greenhouse].  
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disrepair.394 If middle-income tenants compel their landlords to keep their 
dwellings in good repair, the warranty may stymie the slow decay that allows 
units to migrate to the low-cost market.395 
This suggests that, at least in healthy cities, low-income tenants’ quality of 
life may not be improving even if the incidence of housing code violations has 
declined. Some continue to under-consume housing, but in different ways: 
renting units that are too small or in isolated or dangerous areas rather than 
ones that are decrepit. Others may be consuming more housing but paying for it 
with painful sacrifices in other areas of consumption, such as food, clothing, 
and utility service. The lack of “filter-down” housing is certainly not the only 
factor shrinking the supply of low-cost housing. Gentrification, continued 
lower-profile efforts at urban renewal, and recent reductions in federal housing 
subsidies396 all have reduced supply. At the same time, the stagnation of the 
minimum wage, cuts in income support programs, and other factors have 
increased poverty and hence demand. This suggests that the low-cost housing 
market in many areas is precarious enough to raise fears that seeking to force 
improvements in housing quality or tenants’ well-being could risk potentially 
serious unintended consequences.  
The story likely is somewhat different in the ailing cities in the nation’s 
heartland. There, declining populations have placed less pressure on housing 
demand. Abandonment, however, has caused a continuing exodus of units from 
the low-cost housing market. Enforcing the warranty of habitability on behalf 
of middle-income tenants deliberately raising repair claims cannot halt the 
deterioration of low-cost housing to the point that abandonment becomes 
economically desirable. Here, stronger enforcement of the warranty of 
habitability on behalf of those in the worst housing may still have significant 
promise. But, as shown above, that remains an elusive goal. 
D. The Failure of the Implied Warranty of Habitability 
Although appealing in the abstract, the new regime of landlord-tenant law 
inaugurated four decades ago has failed at achieving any of its major goals. 
Some individual tenants no doubt have benefited. Some conscientious landlords 
may have yielded to the moral suasion of the implied warranty. Some 
inefficient landlords may have been induced to sell to companies better capable 
of performing repairs. Some community organizing efforts built around the 
 
394. Ackerman, supra note 86, at 1113–17. 
395. On the other hand, preventing housing decay in transitional communities may have 
large positive externalities for neighbors, see Wilson & Kelling, supra note 81 (finding that even 
small defects in buildings can have a crucial negative signaling effect), and can help stabilize 
those communities by increasing social and economic diversity. 
396. See, e.g., DOUGLAS RICE & BARBARA SARD, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 
DECADE OF NEGLECT HAS WEAKENED FEDERAL LOW-INCOME HOUSING PROGRAMS (2009), 
available at http://www.cbpp.org/2-24-09hous.pdf. 
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implied warranty may have produced positive results. And in some segments of 
the middle-income housing market, these reforms may have achieved positive 
results. For the most part, however, the supposed tenants’ rights revolution is 
the legal system’s exercise in self-delusion. The mistaken belief that the 
implied warranty of habitability somehow “solved” low-income people’s 
housing problems may have induced an unfortunate sense of complacency.  
As different as its doctrinal and institutional setting, the tenants’ rights 
revolution in the end succumbed to the same six defects that doomed the 
contemporaneous welfare rights revolution. First, its multiplicity of goals—
modernization, housing restoration, redistribution, and humanitarianism—
prevented a definitive assessment. It did introduce more contract principles into 
landlord-tenant law, although the result is still very much a hybrid without 
particularly compelling reasons for its idiosyncrasies. Without a better-defined 
goal than “modernization,” this seems a rather modest achievement. Its 
substantive and procedural limitations appear to have confined its direct effects 
to a tiny handful of cases. These likely were too few to have much impact on 
the overall urban environment or the broader distribution of wealth. The 
extreme infrequency of the implied warranty’s application has prevented an 
empirical resolution to the debate about whether it would improve the lot of 
low-income tenants or burden them with an inefficient housing market. It did 
allow some sophisticated, or represented, tenants the choice of whether to 
demand repairs: instead of an absolute right for all tenants, the implied 
warranty should be analyzed as an option available to the small minority of 
tenants winning the legal services “lottery.”397 These individual tenants may be 
best equipped to assess whether their particular landlords will respond and 
whether the value to them of repairs exceeds not only the risks of litigating but 
also any increase in rent as their dwelling becomes more desirable. The 
warranty may therefore have accomplished some redistribution on a micro 
scale. Still, those tenants most in need of redistribution—or simply humanitar-
ian aid—typically have been among the least able to assert the warranty.   
Second, many of these shortcomings result from policy-makers’ inability 
to resist moralizing at low-income people. Those most likely to find the new 
defenses worth raising, and who typically live in the worst housing, are very-
low-income tenants falling behind on their rent involuntarily. Yet the new 
regime could not bring itself to enlist these willing soldiers because it deemed 
them unworthy of the warranty’s assistance. The presence of a few 
redistributionalists in their midst also may have alarmed the new regime’s other 
supporters and caused them to bend over backwards to demonstrate that they 
were not seeking to give poor tenants something for nothing. The stakes for 
 
397. Whether legal services contribute to social welfare by representing these few tenants 
has spawned vigorous debate. E.g., Steven Gunn, Eviction Defense for Poor Tenants: Costly 
Compassion or Justice Served?, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 385 (1995).  
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landlords—and their superior wealth, connections with social elites, and ability 
to organize collective action—made a backlash inevitable. History suggests 
attacks on low-income people often take the form of moralizing.398 
Nonetheless, the regime’s champions were unprepared for that backlash and 
failed to equip judges and legislators to resist it. 
Third, because the new regime never developed any coherent theory of 
why many tenants had low incomes, it was unprepared for the procedural 
challenges it was creating. The same lack of basic skills that prevents many 
low-income people from obtaining better jobs that would allow them to afford 
better housing also tends to make them ineffective advocates in court.399 
Represented tenants did far better in court, but with no one prepared to fund 
free representation for more than a token number of low-income tenants, or to 
wholeheartedly embrace an active role for the judge that would mitigate 
tenants’ disadvantages from being unrepresented, the few tenants winning the 
legal aid lottery have had little impact on the overall picture. More broadly, the 
new regime replaced a system in which landlords dominate by a preponderance 
of financial capital alone with one in which they dominate by a combination of 
preponderances in financial and human capital.   
Fourth, the tenants’ rights revolution’s crude vision of economics required 
it to assume the conditions required for its success. Some of these— 
particularly a glut of rental housing—may fortuitously have existed at the 
revolution’s inception. Others were lacking, including market conditions that 
prevented landlords from exiting the low-rent housing market and sufficient 
incentives for tenants to deliberately withhold rent.   
Fifth, the tenants’ rights revolution relied on a simplistic understanding of 
the lower courts that hear eviction cases. Hard-pressed courts can and do ration 
adjudicatory resources and otherwise behave in many of the same ways as 
administrative agencies. Judges and clerks have well-established views of their 
mission. Many have longstanding relationships with repeat-player landlords 
and landlords’ lawyers. Policy-makers underestimated how difficult it would be 
to implement the warranty under these conditions. 
Finally, and most importantly, the revolution’s multiplicity of goals 
prevented any creative adaptation to the dramatic changes in both housing 
markets and antipoverty policy since the revolution’s onset. Resurrecting the 
new regime of landlord-tenant law will require a willingness to confront these 
and other entrenched problems and the devotion of political capital to surmount 
them. Based on the record to date, we have little grounds for optimism. 
 
398. Super, New Moralizers, supra note 50, at 2053–55, 2073–74. 
399. See Martha R. Burt, The “Hard-to-Serve”: Definitions and Implications, in WELFARE 
REFORM: THE NEXT ACT 163–70 (Alan Weil & Kenneth Finegold eds., 2002) (finding that many 
of the conditions preventing low-income people from finding and holding jobs, such as illiteracy 
and psychological ailments, also prevent them from interacting effectively with the welfare 
system). 
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CONCLUSION 
The breadth and severity of legal, economic, and practical problems surely 
doomed the implied warranty of habitability. Some of its goals may have been 
unrealistic from the start: the economics of the housing market may well have 
prevented significant redistribution of wealth from landlords to tenants and 
made efforts to stamp out one kind of housing problem likely to yield more 
housing problems of another type. A more thoughtful approach, however, 
might have allowed more effective humanitarian interventions and might have 
produced a more coherent modernization of landlord-tenant law. 
The narrow lesson of the failure of the implied warranty of habitability is 
that direct subsidies have far more potential than regulatory action to improve 
low-income tenants’ housing conditions. Researchers have come to see 
improving incomes, rather than housing-specific strategies, as pivotal to 
preventing homelessness.400 HUD reports the number of tenants with worst-
case housing needs moderates only when incomes rise.401 In a sense, the 
implied warranty was a forerunner of the movement to shift responsibility for 
aiding low-income people to elements of the private sector, albeit here 
unwilling ones. 
Housing assistance programs increasingly attempt to address all four 
kinds of detrimental housing conditions.402 Units long have needed to pass 
inspections to receive subsidies under federal voucher programs. Since the late 
1960s, federal subsidy programs have sought to limit tenants’ shelter costs to 
30 percent of their incomes.403 A family’s size determines the size of the unit 
for which it is eligible. And Congress and HUD have steadily made housing 
vouchers more portable, allowing low-income recipients to move from areas of 
concentrated poverty.404 Unfortunately, the supply of vouchers has never 
approached the number of low-income renters in need.405 Indeed, Congress 
consistently has failed to increase the supply of housing vouchers sufficiently 
to offset the shrinkage in unsubsidized low-cost housing. As a result, only one 
in five eligible families receives a subsidy.406 
 
400. Martha R. Burt, Causes of the Growth of Homelessness During the 1980s, 2 HOUS. 
POL’Y DEBATE 903, 904 (1991). 
401. HUD TRENDS, supra note 381, at 1. 
402. Although welfare economics might suggest that cash transfers would be more 
beneficial than in-kind assistance, Komesar, supra note 150, at 1175–76, the U.S. electorate has 
developed a strong antipathy for cash aid programs. Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 128, at 
1291–92. 
403. U.S. Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(A)(i) (2006). 
404. ABT ASSOCS. INC., EFFECTS OF HOUSING VOUCHERS ON WELFARE FAMILIES vi 
(2006). 
405. See Super, Political Economy, supra note 133, at 695–701 (explaining the difficulty 
the electorate has comprehending programs that do not serve all eligible people making 
application). 
406. See Super, Greenhouse, supra note 393, at 1190–96 (proposing consolidation of 
existing housing assistance efforts into a single program available to all low-income people). 
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The broader lesson is that a far more sophisticated approach is required to 
regulate effectively on behalf of low-income people. Even Milton Friedman 
recognized that a necessary quid pro quo for avoiding the inefficiency of 
regulatory redistributions was an adequate system of direct supports for low-
income people.407 With contemporary conservatives increasingly unwilling to 
support tax-and-transfer policies, low-income people’s advocates cannot afford 
to abandon regulatory responses to humanitarian problems altogether.   
Regulatory interventions, however, must be much more carefully designed 
than they have been in the past. First, they should either seek to correct some 
demonstrable market failure or should serve an important humanitarian 
purpose. Vague concepts like modernization are unlikely to mobilize much 
support but can sow confusion. Instrumental arguments also muddy the waters 
and make the enterprise vulnerable to counter-proposals to accomplish the 
same ends in another way. Above all, even a hint of broad redistributive goals 
will taint the effort and cause its champions to make disastrous concessions to 
distance themselves from that taint. 
Second, humanitarian regulation should not be attempted unless its 
advocates are prepared to respond to efforts to stigmatize beneficiaries. Thus, 
for example, prohibiting utility terminations during winter months will benefit 
spendthrifts as well as infirm seniors; if the plan’s proponents are unwilling to 
make the case that cutting off anyone’s heat in the dead of winter is inhumane, 
debates over what are and are not worthy causes for arrears will quickly 
consume the plan.  
Third, the system’s operation should be as automatic as possible. Relying 
on low-income people to negotiate even fairly simple procedures, or on 
bureaucracies to empathize with them and adjudicate in their favor, all but 
guarantees a high failure rate. Moral tests are among the most problematic to 
adjudicate; avoiding them is likely to improve the regulatory regime’s 
operation considerably.  
Fourth, burdens should be spread broadly through society to avoid 
creating an obvious core of opponents. Barring winter shut-offs, for example, 
increases utility companies’ costs, which they presumably pass on to 
consumers. The impact on each individual consumer, however, is too small to 
spur political mobilization.408  
Fifth, where possible, regulatory interventions should seek to motivate 
actions with benefits that clearly exceed their costs. Thus, for example, the cost 
for a landlord to cover exposed wiring is a pittance, yet the potential harm to 
the tenant’s children is extreme. Imposing severe penalties for exposed wiring 
is unlikely to drive landlords from the market. Such a regulatory regime would 
 
407. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 177–82. 
408. The vehemence of utility companies’ opposition to moratoria on terminations is likely 
to depend on what other issues are pending on the state’s energy regulatory agenda.  
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merely reproduce the result the parties likely would have negotiated themselves 
with full information and bargaining capacity.  
Finally, where regulation demands costly changes, advocates should 
carefully explore possible collateral consequences. They then should monitor 
implementation and be prepared to adapt if new or unnoticed conditions 
undermine their regulatory scheme similar to the way housing market changes 
undermined the tenants’ rights revolution. For example, the cost of abating lead 
paint is daunting, but the lifelong harm to children exposed to lead makes it 
necessary. The cost is great enough to affect the supply of rental housing. 
Advocates therefore should consider whether subsidizing those costs or taking 
other actions to preserve housing supply are cost-effective, and they should 
monitor changes in that supply.   
Even following all of these principles will provide no guarantees of 
success and will not supplant fiscal policy as the primary means of protecting 
low-income people from humanitarian crises. It will, however, mean that all of 
the hope and effort invested in the tenants’ rights revolution will not have been 
in vain.  
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